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Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code addresses the "Battle of the
Forms." In a typical commercial transaction, a seller may respond to a buyer's offer
by proposing additional or diferent terns and expressly conditioning its acceptance
on the buyer's assent to these terms. f the parties subsequently perform, despite the
failure of the forms to match, a question arises as to the terms of the resulting con-
tract. ThisArticle examines both scholarly commentary and casesproposing alterna-
tive methods of applying section 2-207 to this scenario. The Article offers an
alternative methodology that diferentiates between standard counteroffers and con-
ditional acceptances. The author maintains that the offeror's acceptance of goods
shipped by the offeree can serve only as an acceptance of a standard counteroffer.
Performance by the offeror in the case of a conditional acceptance results in a con-
tract, not on the terms of the conditional acceptance, but rather on the terms pro-
vided in section 2-207(3) of the Code. The author concludes that although his
analysis is quite formalistic, it is consistent with the language of the Code and the
history of section 2-207, and reasonably accommodates the Code's goals offairness,
predictability, and efficiency.
INTRODUCTION
PERHAPS NO SECTION of the Uniform Commercial Code
generates more scholarly comment than section 2-207,1 which
* Associate Professor of Law, College of Law, The Ohio State University. B.A.,
University of Pittsburgh (1969); J.D., University of Pittsburgh (1975); LL.M., Columbia
University (1978).
I wish to thank my colleague, Al Clovis, for his extremely helpful remarks on earlier
drafts of this Article. I dedicate this Article to my father.
1. Section 2-207 provides:
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addresses the "Battle of the Forms."2 Despite this commentary
and the numerous cases dealing with section 2-207,3 it remains
shrouded in uncertainty. This Article collects recent cases and re-
lates them to the various approaches to section 2-207 suggested in
existing literature.4 More ambitiously, it seeks to demonstrate that
these approaches are inadequate to resolve the problems for which
the drafters designed section 2-207. Next, this Article offers an
alternative methodology that does little or no violence to the lan-
guage of the provision, provides for an economically efficient mar-
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which
is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms addi-
tional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly
made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract.
Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a reason-
able time after notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to
establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a
contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on which
the writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated
under any other provisions of this Act.
2. See Baird & Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the Forms.- A Reassess-
ment of§ 2-207, 68 VA. L. REv. 1217 (1982); Barron & Dunfee, Two Decades of 2-207
Review, Reflection and Revision, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 171 (1975); Davenport, How to Han-
dle Sales of Goods. The Problem of Conflicting Purchase Orders and Acceptances and New
Concepts in Contract Law, 19 Bus. LAw. 75 (1963); Duesenberg, Contract Creation: The
Continuing Struggle with Additional and Different Terms Under Unform Commercial Code
Section 2-207, 34 Bus. LAW. 1477 (1979); Hawkland, Major Changes Under the Unform
Commercial Code in the Formation and Terms of Sales Contracts, 10 PRAc. LAW., May
1964, at 73; Murray, Intention Over Terms." An Exploration of UCC 2-207 and New Section
60, Restatement ofContracts, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 317 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Inten-
tion Over Terms]; Murray, Section 2-207 ofthe Unform Commercial Code.- Another Word
About Incipient Unconscionability, 39 U. PirrT. L. REV. 597 (1978) [hereinafter cited as In-
cipient Unconscionability]; Taylor, U C.C Section 2-207." An Integration of Legal Abstrac-
tions and Transactional Reality, 46 U. CIN. L. REv. 419 (1977); Note, In Defense ofthe
Batile of Forms: Curing the 'First Shot" Flaw in Section 2-207 ofthe Unform Commercial
Code, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 384 (1973) [hereinafter cited as First Shot]; Note, Al Quiet on
the 2-207 Front?, 35 U. PiT. L. REv. 685 (1974); Comment, Nonconforming Acceptances
Under Section 2-207 ofthe Uniform Commercial Code. An End to the Battle ofthe Forms,
30 U. CmI. L. REv. 540 (1963) [hereinafter cited as NonconformingAcceptances]; Comment,
Offeree's Response Materially Altering an Offer Solely to Offeror's Disadvantage Is an Ac-
ceptance Conditional on Offeror's Assent to the Additional Terms Under Section 2-207 ofthe
Uniform Commercial Code, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 132 (1967); Comment, Section 2-207 ofthe
Un/form Commercial Code-New Rules for the "Battle ofthe Forms," 32 U. PiTT. L. REv.
209 (1971) [hereinafter cited as New Rules].
3. See generally [Findex] U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) T 2207 (1978) (collecting
cases citing § 2-207).
4. See infra notes 48-143 and accompanying text.
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ketplace, and results in considerable predictability and certainty
without unduly sacrificing flexibility and fairness.' Finally, the
Article critiques a proposal for a return to the pre-Code common
law approach to offer and acceptance.' The author maintains that
the benefits of his proposed analysis outweigh those of a return to
the "mirror image" rule.
I. SECTION 2-207-A SHORT HISTORY AND EXPLANATION
Under pre-Code common law, a response to an offer that va-
ried the terms of the offer or added new terms did not constitute
an acceptance. Rather, it acted as a counteroffer which the origi-
nal offeror could either accept or reject.7 If the original offeror
failed to respond or rejected the counteroffer, no contract re-
sulted.8 However, if the offeror accepted the counteroffer either
by an express affirmative response or, more commonly, by ac-
cepting goods shipped by the offeree, a contract was formed on the
terms of the counteroffer.9
This rule was satisfactory at a time when parties individually
and carefully negotiated most transactions. Since parties were
often aware of all of the terms contained in the correspondence,
the rule was unlikely to frustrate their expectations. As commer-
cial actors increased in size and complexity, however, the assump-
tions underlying the mirror image rule became increasingly
unrealistic and its application occasionally frustrated the expecta-
tions of the parties.' 0 As a firm's size increased, the number of its
5. See infra notes 144-75 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 176-91 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., In re Marcalus Mfg., 120 F. Supp. 784 (D.N.J. 1954); Poel v. Brunswick-
Balke-Collender Co., 216 N.Y. 310, 110 N.E. 619 (1915); 17 W. 50th St. Corp. v. Tolerton,
177 N.Y.S. 897, 107 Misc. 609 (Civ. Ct. 1919).
8. Theoretically, the parties could then walk away from the contract. See, e.g., Phoe-
nix Iron & Steel Co. v. Wilcoff Co., 253 F. 165 (6th Cir. 1918); Batie v. Allison, 77 Iowa
313,42 N.W. 306 (1889); Malls v. Knapp & Baxter, Inc., 196 A.D. 628, 188 N.Y.S. 5 (1921).
9. See, e.g., Tulane Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Singer Lumber Co., 168 So. 368 (La.
Ct. App. 1936); Vaughan's Seed Store, Inc. v. Morris April & Bros., 123 N.J.L. 26, 7 A.2d
868 (1939).
10. See, e.g., Vaughan's SeedStore, 123 N.J.L. 26, 7 A.2d 868 (1939); Malls, 196 A.D.
628, 188 N.Y.S. 5 (1921).
A recent article dealing with section 2-207 argues correctly, however, that the mirror
image rule did not always operate with draconian results. See Baird & Weisberg, supra
note 2, at 1233-37. As the article indicates, a substantial number of escape hatches were
available to courts that were not inclined to strictly apply the rule. Id. Accordingly, courts
often decided that an additional or different term in an acceptance merely suggested an
addition to the contract which the original offeror was free to accept or reject. In such a
case, the court would find an acceptance despite the variant terms. See, e.g., Butler v.
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transactions, customers, and suppliers also increased. Clerks and
shipping personnel with neither the authority to negotiate on be-
half of their employers, nor the time and training to analyze corre-
spondence in detail, often were responsible for routine
transactions." Further, firms began using form documents to
communicate offers and acceptances. In these forms, each party
attempted to include terms appropriate to the transaction in-
volved, and which operated in favor of the party sending the
form.' 2 As the use of forms increased and the number of these
terms of general application grew, the boilerplate of modem day
purchase and acknowledgment forms was born.' 3 Persons in posi-
tions of authority and those who understood these terms simply
ignored them. Parties only considered the "dickered"
Foley, 211 Mich. 668, 179 N.W. 34 (1920); Foster v. West Publishing Co., 77 Okla. 114, 186
P. 1083 (1920); cf Orr v. Doubleday, Page & Co., 223 N.Y. 334, 119 N.E. 552 (1918) (stat-
ing that a clause in an acceptance requesting acknowledgment did not invalidate accept-
ance).
Baird and Weisberg's statement that "in its rigid form, the mirror-image rule existed
only in the treatises and hornbooks" is probably correct. Baird & Weisberg, supra note 2,
at 1233 n.46. This author's research, however, indicates that Baird and Weisberg overstate
the case when they conclude that the flaws of the mirror image rule were "largely aca-
demic." Id. at 1237. In fact, a substantial number of courts strictly applied the rule. See,
e.g. ,Phoenix Iron & Steel, 253 F. 165 (6th Cir. 1918); Derrick v. Monette, 73 Ala. 75 (1882);
Rugg v. Davis, 15 Ill. App. 647 (1885); Batie, 77 Iowa 313, 42 N.W. 306 (1889); Vaughan's
Seed Store, 123 N.J.L. 26, 7 A.2d 868 (1939); Watts v. Thomas Carter & Sons, 207 A.D.
656, 202 NY.S. 852 (1924); Malis, 196 A.D. 628, 188 N.Y.S. 5 (1921). These cases and
others also render suspect Baird and Weisberg's statement that Poel, 216 N.Y. 310, 110
N.E. 619 (1915), is "altogether exceptional in its rigid application of the mirror-image
rule." Baird & Weisberg, supra note 2, at 1235 n.52.
Nevertheless, Baird and Weisberg make a valuable contribution by revealing that the
application of the mirror image rule was more flexible than generally supposed. Given the
disparate nature of the case law, it is probably useful to view the mirror image rule as often
creating a presumption that the presence of additional or different terms in a purported
acceptance creates a counteroffer. See, e.g., Derrick, 73 Ala. 75 (1982). Section 2-207
merely acts to reverse that presumption. For further discussion of Baird and Weisberg's
article, see infra notes 176-89 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 159 (1982); Macaulay, Non-Contractual
Relations in Business.- 4 Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55, 59 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as Non-Contractual Relations]; Macaulay, The Use and Non-Use of Contracts in the
Manufacturing Industry, 9 PRAc. LAW., Nov. 1963, at 13, 22, 28-29 [hereinafter cited as Use
and Non- Use of Contracts].
12. See Barron & Dunfee, supra note 2, at 173.
13. The purchase order form used by the Janitrol Aero Divison of the Midland-Ross
Corporation, Columbus, Ohio, contains a prime example of the boilerplate of offer and
acceptance forms. It has on its reverse side 19 paragraphs of very fine print labeled
"Purchase Order Terms and Conditions." These paragraphs deal with terms concerning
warranties, inspection, transportation and packing, patents and trademarks, insolvency of
the seller, assignment of the contract, and choice of law. Other purchase order and ac-
knowledgment forms collected by the author from local industries are remarkably similar
to the one described above.
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terms-essential matters like description, price, and quantity-to
be important. The practice of ignoring the boilerplate created no
difficulty in the typical case where the seller sent conforming
goods on time and the buyer promptly paid the price. When dis-
putes arose, however, the mirror image rule could frustrate the
justifiable expectations of the parties and occasionally produce
grossly unfair results.
No binding contract existed upon the exchange of forms if the
offeree's acceptance or acknowledgment form contained terms
that were contradictory or additional to those found on the of-
feror's form. For example, if an offeror-buyer sought to withdraw
prior to performance from what might otherwise be an economi-
cally disadvantageous transaction, it merely had to find a varia-
tion in the two forms,14 even though both parties previously
assumed that a binding contract existed. When the parties per-
formed despite the failure of the forms to match, one party might
object to performance by the other party. Consequently, it often
became necessary to determine those terms of the contract other
than the dickered terms. For example, if a seller's nonmatching
acknowledgement had the effect of a counteroffer, the buyer's ac-
ceptance of the goods usually had the surprising effect of an ac-
ceptance of the counteroffer. 15 As a result, the offeree's form
established the terms of the contract. This arbitrary preference for
the party (usually the original offeree) sending the last document
(firing the "last shot") before shipment and acceptance of the
goods, incorporated terms into the contract that the original of-
feror, perhaps even the original offeree,16 did not expect to be part
of the transaction.
Despite the risks inherent in a "form mode" of doing busi-
ness, 7 businessmen neither reverted to their prior practice of per-
sonal, high-level correspondence, nor began to read each other's
forms more carefully. Several reasons exist for this lack of
change. First and most important, transacting by printed form
was efficient. Firm size made it too costly to negotiate individually
every term that might be relevant to a particular transaction.
Moreover, increased business volume precluded firm management
from becoming involved in each sale or purchase made by the
14. See, e.g., Rugg, 15 Il. App. 647 (1885).
15. See, e.g., Vaughan's Seed Store, 123 N.J.L. 26, 7 A.2d 868 (1939).
16. See infra text accompanying note 21.
17. See generally Taylor, supra note 2, at 423-26 (the form mode of transacting may
increase the possibility of a contract that is actually contrary to the intent of the parties).
1983]
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firm. Also, large sellers and buyers may have hundreds of cus-
tomers or suppliers, each with their own form. The time and ex-
pense necessary to analyze each form individually and to
negotiate over unfavorable terms was not justified because the
terms were unlikely to be relevant in the vast majority of transac-
tions. Finally, the use of forms enabled low-level personnel to
process routine purchases and sales. Thus, the economic advan-
tages of transacting business in the form mode far outweighed the
risks.
In addition, businessmen were perhaps often unaware of the
potential consequences of dealing in the form mode. In most situ-
ations, neither party would seek to withdraw prior to performance
and nothing went wrong with the transaction during or after per-
formance to make the undickered printed terms relevant. Even
when the transaction posed problems, the parties probably re-
solved the differences in many cases without considering the for-
mal contract terms.
Despite the efficiency advantages of dealing in the form mode,
the application of the mirror image rule to this type of transaction
caused significant difficulty in individual cases.' 8 The drafters of
the Uniform Commercial Code recognized the reality and utility
of conducting business in the form mode. In section 2-207, they
sought to recognize this world of forms and avoid the unexpected
and inequitable results sometimes produced by the mirror image
rule. 19
In a typical high-volume commercial transaction, a buyer's
purchasing agent sends a purchase order form to a seller that spec-
ifies essentials such as the nature, quantity, and price of the
buyer's desired purchase. The purchase order is usually replete
with probuyer boilerplate provisions dealing with warranties,
shipment, and the like.2' The seller, through its sales agent, re-
18. See cases cited supra note 10.
19. There is some indication that the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
intended to incorporate the philosophy of § 2-207. Comment a to § 59 states that "a defi-
nite and seasonable expression of acceptance is operative despite the statement of addi-
tional or different terms if the acceptance is not made to depend on assent to the additional
or different terms." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 59 comment a (1981). This
language closely tracks the language of § 2-207, indicating that the drafters may have in-
tended to modify the common law mirror image rule. The textual sections of the new
Restatement do not clarify this intention, however, although they do not preclude such an
interpretation. For an excellent discussion of the extent to which the new Restatement
parallels U.C.C. § 2-207, see Murray, The Standardized Agreement Phenomena in the Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 735, 744-761 (1982).
20. See supra note 13.
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ceives the purchase order form and notes the important-that is,
dickered-terms. If these dickered terms are agreeable, the seller
responds with its own form that acknowledges or accepts the
buyer's order, thanks the buyer for its business, and contains
proseller boilerplate. It is, of course, extremely unlikely that all of
the terms on the two forms exactly correspond. In fact, beyond
the most basic terms of the purchase order and acknowledgment
form, neither the buyer nor the seller is usually familiar with the
contents of its own form.2 Further, neither the principals nor
their agents typically focus their attention on the nondickered
terms of the other party's form.22 When a dispute concerning per-
formance (or nonperformance) by either or both parties results in
actual or threatened litigation, the parties must scrutinize the
terms of their contract. The content of the respective forms then
becomes crucial and section 2-207 must be applied.
The following examples give a rough idea of the operation of
section 2-207. A buyer seeks widgets from a seller and sends the
seller its purchase order. The reverse side of this form contains
numerous provisions in addition to those governing price, quanti-
ty, and shipment. However, it contains no term dealing with the
subject of arbitration. The seller receives the buyer's purchase or-
der, agrees to the number of widgets and their price, and responds
with an acknowledgment form to the buyer. The seller's form
contains a provision providing for arbitration in the event of any
disputes. After the seller ships the goods and the buyer accepts, a
dispute arises and the buyer threatens litigation. In response, the
seller points to the provision on its form and demands arbitration.
Under section 2-207, the seller's acknowledgment form oper-
ates as an acceptance because it is "[a] definite and seasonable
expression of acceptance."22 The presence of the arbitration pro-
vision on the seller's form and the absence of one on the buyer's
form does not alter this conclusion; 24 section 2-207(1) states that a
definite and seasonable expression of acceptance operates as an
21. See Non-Contractual Relations, supra note 11, at 59; Incipient Unconscionability,
supra note 2, at 609.
22. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
23. U.C.C. § 2-207(1).
24. But see Roto-Lith Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (lst Cir. 1962). In this
infamous case, the court held that a disclaimer of warranties in a seller's acknowledgment
form precluded the form from operating as an acceptance because it materially altered the
terms of the purchase order. Id. at 498. The reasoning of the court was obviously contrary
to the policy of§ 2-207. To say that commentators widely criticize this case is a monumen-
tal understatement.
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acceptance "even though it states terms additional to . . those
offered . ... 21 Inasmuch as the forms agree on the basic dick-
ered terms and the seller otherwise appears willing to perform, a
contract exists between the parties. Because both parties are
merchants, the arbitration provision becomes part of the contract
under section 2-207(2) unless: (1) the buyer's offer expressly limits
acceptance to its own terms; (2) the provision materialy alters the
contract; or (3) the buyer notified the seller of its objection to the
arbitration provision.26
In the present example, (1) and (3) are not applicable.
Whether the arbitration provision becomes part of the contract
depends upon its materiality. As courts in most jurisdictions
would consider such a term material, it probably would not be-
come part of the contract.27 Note, however, that if the arbitration
provision is considered to be an immaterial addition to the con-
tract, it would become part of the contract.28
A variation of the example arises if the buyer's offer expressly
limits acceptance to the terms of the offer.29 In that event, the
additional term on the seller's form-the arbitration provi-
sion-does not become part of the contract since the buyer's offer
does not mention arbitration. 31 In this instance, the buyer suc-
cessfully maintains control of its offer. While the Code does not
explicitly require it, some commentators wisely suggest that lan-
guage expressly restricting acceptance to the terms of the offer
must meet the Code definition of conspicuousness to be
effective.31
25. U.C.C. § 2-207(1).
26. Id. § 2-207(2).
27. See Valmont Indus. v. Matsui & Co. (U.S.A.), 419 F. Supp. 1238 (D. Neb. 1976);
Frames Hosiery Mills v. Burlington Indus., 19 N.C. App. 678, 200 S.E.2d 668, aff'd, 285
N.C. 344, 204 S.E.2d 834 (1974). But cf. Klockner, Inc. v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), 17
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 915 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (arbitration clause not a material
alteration where offeror receiving acknowledgment form would have reason to know of its
presence because of industry practice of arbitration).
28. U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b).
29. See id § 2-207(1).
30. To hold credence, one must assume that the restrictive language in the buyer's
offer permits the response to be an effective acceptance even though the offer contains an
additional term. See infra note 43.
31. See, e.g., Barron and Dunfee, supra note 2, at 191. "A term or clause is conspicu-
ous when it is so written that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to
have noticed it." U.C.C. § 1-210(10). The position of these commentators is well taken
and the history of the section supports it. See ALI & NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS, Supp. No. I TO THE 1952 OFFICIAL DRAFT OF TEXT AND COMMENTS
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II. THE SCOPE OF SUBSECTION (3)
In the situations described above, section 2-207 operates with
relative ease and efficiency. While certain problems exist,32 the ap-
plication accomplishes the basic purpose of section 2-207-a bind-
ing contract exists when the parties reasonably expect it. The
previous illustrations, however, assume that the offeree's response
constitutes a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance,
thus forming a contract. On the other hand, if one cannot legiti-
mately characterize the offeree's response as an acceptance, it does
not create a contract under 2-207(1).
The fact that the offeree's response does not create a contract
does not necessarily mean that a contract does not exist. Section
2-206 of the Code permits acceptance of an offer for prompt or
current shipment by either prompt shipment of the goods or a
prompt promise to ship.3 3 This principle is inapplicable only if
the offer unambiguously indicates a particular mode of accept-
ance. Thus, if a seller-offeree receives a purchase order for cur-
rent shipment and ships the goods without further
communication, the act of shipment is an acceptance of the offer
contained in the purchase order.34 The offeree's shipment of the
goods constitutes an acceptance of the offer, even if it sends a writ-
ten response which does not act as an acceptance under section 2-
207(1), so long as shipment occurs prior to or contemporaneously
with the sending of the response. In fact, acceptance by shipment
OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-207(4)(a), at 6 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Sue-
PLEMENT No. I].
While it is true that the underlying premise of § 2-207 is that the party receiving the
form only reads the dickered terms, if limiting language is pronounced there is at least a
reasonable opportunity for it to attract the attention of the offeree. In addition, the defini-
tion of conspicuousness does not preclude placement of language limiting acceptance to the
terms of the offer on a printed form. The fact that § 2-207 was drafted to address the battle
of the forms, and yet still allows the offeror to so condition its offer, supports this analysis.
32. For example, does § 2-207 permit different as well as additional terms on a re-
sponse to become part of the contract under § 2-207(2)? While § 2-207(1) permits a re-
sponse which contains either additional or different terms to operate as an acceptance, § 2-
207(2), permitting terms on the response to become part of the contract despite their ab-
sence on the offer document, mentions only additional terms. While much commentary
exists on this question, this issue appears to have little practical impact despite the restric-
tion imposed by § 2-207(2)(b). See, e.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 27 (2d ed. 1980); Barron & Dunfee, supra
note 2, at 186-88.
33. U.C.C. § 2-206(l)(b).
34. Generally, shipment occurs when the seller delivers the goods to the carrier, the
parties make a proper contract for their shipment, and the seller notifies the buyer of the
shipment. See U.C.C. § 2-504.
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of the goods may occur even if the response is mailed prior to
shipment, so long as shipment precedes receipt of the response by
the offeror. 5
Section 2-207 has limited application to a contract formed by
shipment of the goods. Since a contract already exists on the of-
feror's terms as a result of shipment, the offeree's written response
is merely a proposal to modify the terms of an existing contract.
As such, its terms can only become part of the contract under 2-
207(2). Under 2-207(1), it is unnecessary to decide whether the
written response was a definite and seasonable expression of ac-
ceptance, a counteroffer, or something else.36 Courts sometimes
become unnecessarily mired in this difficult question when section
2-206 could provide a convenient escape.37
35. A rejection or counteroffer is effective only upon its receipt by the offeror, whereas
the acceptance occurs at the time of shipment. See 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 90 (1963). If the offeror receives the goods prior to its receipt of the counteroffer, the
counteroffer clearly has no effect. However, the result is opaque if the offeror receives the
counteroffer prior to its receipt of the goods but after their shipment. Corbin suggests that
the counteroffer should only vitiate an already existing acceptance when the offeror materi-
ally changes its position in reliance upon the counteroffer or rejection. Id. This result oc-
curs infrequently since the offeror often receives notice of shipment before it receives the
counteroffer. See U.C.C. § 2-504. Yet, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts suggests that
if a counteroffer arrives prior to documentary acceptance, the acceptance is only effective as
a counteroffer. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 40 (1981). Quaere: (1) If ac-
ceptance occurs by shipment under § 2-206, does it "arrive" for purposes of the Restate-
ment when the goods arrive or when notice of shipment arrives? Presumably, deeming that
the arrival of notice of shipment constitutes acceptance serves the policy of protecting the
offeror, (2) If a late arriving acceptance constitutes a counteroffer under the Restatement, is
it a counteroffer on the offeror's terms or on the terms contained in the earlier arriving
counteroffer? Both the Restatement and Corbin suggest that the acceptance constitutes a
counteroffer on the offeror's terms. Id.; 1 A. CORBIN, supra, at § 90. This may cause
problems if the offeree's counteroffer indicated that it shipped the goods only on the terms
of the counteroffer.
36. See infra note 38.
37. See, e.g., Baumgold Bros. v. Allan M. Fox Co., East, 375 F. Supp. 807 (N.D. Ohio
1973).
An interesting variation exists when an offeror and offeree have had prior dealings.
Suppose that each time the offeree ships goods to the offeror, it includes an acknowledg-
ment form containing terms different from those on the offeror's form. Under these cir-
cumstances, does shipment of the goods still form a contract on the offeror's terms even
though the offeror has had numerous opportunities to become aware of the variant terms
on the offeree's form?
Shipment of the goods can create a contract, but it is not a contract formed on the
offeror's terms. Rather, the continual receipt of goods accompanied by a variant acknowl-
edgment precludes the offeror's reasonable expectation that shipment of the goods indicates
assent to the offeror's terms. This author would find the terms of the contract on the basis
of § 2-207(3). The course of dealing between the parties indicates that neither is con-
tracting with reference to the forms and neither should expect its terms to control. Thus,
the contract has its foundation in the acts of the parties, rather than in their documents.
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When no acceptance occurs prior to the offeror's receipt of the
offeree's written response, it becomes necessary to determine the
nature and legal effect of the response. Under traditional contract
law, a response that is not an acceptance would probably be either
a flat rejection or a counteroffer.38  Nothing indicates that the
Code drafters intended section 2-207 to change this result. Section
2-207 does, however, avoid the presumption of counteroffer inher-
ent in the mirror image rule where a response merely contains
additional or different terms. Yet, there is no evidence that the
drafters intended to eliminate entirely an offeree's ability to make
a counteroffer, even when parties conduct a transaction through
the exchange of printed forms.
39
Under some circumstances, the offeree's form might constitute
a counteroffer. The offeror, as "master of the offer," can stipulate
the manner in which the offeree can accept.4 ° Under the Code, if
the offer does not unambiguously indicate otherwise, it invites
"acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the
circumstances."'4' But if an offeror unambiguously indicates an ex-
clusive manner or medium of acceptance, no acceptance results
unless the offeree accepts in the stipulated manner.42 For exam-
ple, the offeror can stipulate that acceptance be only by a writing
that explicitly accepts all of the offeror's terms and adds no
others.43 Alternatively, the offeror could require that the offeree
The terms on which the forms agree are part of the contract as are terms provided by the
Code, usage of trade, course of dealing, and course of performance. See U.C.C. § 2-207(3);
infra note 175.
38. An offeree might also respond in a way that is neither a rejection nor a counterof-
fer-it may merely indicate its interest in the offer to the offeror. This Article does not
concern itself with this response as it rarely occurs in a transaction involving a battle of the
forms.
39. In fact, there is evidence that the drafters revised the section specifically to pre-
serve this ability. In the Code hearings conducted by the New York Law Revision Com-
mission, Karl Llewelyn, the principal architect of the Code, stated the following about § 2-
207: "[W]e were attempting to say, whether we got it said or not, that a document which
said, 'This is an acceptance only if the additional terms we state are taken by you' is not a
definite and seasonable expression of acceptance but is an expression of a counteroffer."
STATE OF NEW YORK, I REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMM'N FOR 1954 AND RECORD
OF HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 181 [hereinafter cited as 1954 LAW
REVISION COMMISSION REPORT].
40. Eg., Kroeze v. Chloride Group Ltd., 572 F.2d 1099, 1105 (5th Cir. 1978); Smith v.
Boise Kenworth Sales, Inc., 102 Idaho 63, 67, 625 P.2d 417, 421 (1981); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 29 (1981); 1 A. CORBIN, .supra note 35, at § 82.
41. U.C.C. § 2-206(l)(a).
42. See id. § 2-206 comment 1.
43. It is important to distinguish this situation from one in which an offer expressly
limits acceptance to the terms of the offer. The latter situation is governed by § 2-207(2)(a).
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sign and return the offeror's form without any additions or
changes. If the offeree does not respond in the required manner,
but does not flatly reject the offer, the response can act as a
counteroffer.44
Even if the offeror does not stipulate a particular manner of
acceptance, the offeree's response may still be a counteroffer and
thus fail to create a contract. For example, a seller may respond
to a buyer's order form by indicating that it cannot accept the or-
der on the buyer's terms, but then proceed to offer different or
additional terms. If rejection is by clear and unambiguous lan-
guage, no contract results from the exchange of correspondence.45
The seller may also make acceptance expressly conditional on the
buyer's assent to the additional or different terms. If so, no con-
An offer which expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer does not indicate a
particular manner or medium of acceptance. Under U.C.C. § 2-206(l)(a), any reasonable
manner or medium of acceptance is sufficient, and under § 2-207(1) an expression of ac-
ceptance concludes a contract even if it contains terms in addition to or different from those
in the offeror's form. Because of the express limitation, such an acceptance results in a
contract on the offeror's terms only, despite the additional or different terms on the offeree's
form. Professors White and Summers recognize the distinction between the two situations
which others often overlook. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 32, at 33.
44. But see supra note 38.
45. Nevertheless, scholars differ sharply about the result when the seller later ships the
goods and the buyer accepts them without further communication between the parties.
Compare Incipient Unconscionability, supra note 2, at 620-21 (§ 2-207 does not change the
common law result that acceptance of goods constitutes acceptance of seller's counteroffer),
with Barron & Dunfee, supra note 2, at 179 (§ 2-207(3) changes the pre-Code rule, and the
contract consists of terms on which the offer and response agree, together with supplemen-
tary Code terms).
In addition, an intriguing question exists as to whether a response which differs as to the
essential or dickered terms on an offeror's form can ever be a definite and seasonable ex-
pression of acceptance. Some commentators suggest that this can never occur. See. e.g.,
Barron & Dunfee, supra note 2, at 181. While this view is generally sound, one cannot
accept it without some qualification. First, the surrounding circumstances, including usage
of trade and prior course of dealing, may indicate to the offeror, in rare circumstances, that
the offeree is willing to contract on the offeror's terms and is merely proposing a modifica-
tion that it hopes the offeror will accept. This might occur when the offeree's response is
entitled "ACCEPTANCE" or "ACKNOWLEDGMENT" and indicates no unwillingness
to perform absent the offeror's agreement to the altered term. Second, one must remember
that the response must change an essential term. Disagreement over minor terms cannot
constitute a counteroffer and still be consistent with the language of § 2-207(1). The ques-
tion must be whether a reasonable offeror receiving the response would believe that the
change indicates the offeree's unwillingness to proceed with the transaction except on its
own terms. Such an analysis would include an inquiry into which terms an offeror nor-
mally checks in similar circumstances, and a determination of whether others in the trade
generally regard the term as essential. Thus, while disagreement over terms such as price,
quantity, and delivery date generally precludes a response from being a definite and sea-
sonable expression of acceptance, there may be some rare exceptions.
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tract exists under 2-207(1).46 Further, the mere fact that a form
used in many transactions by the offeree contains the counteroffer
should not, by itself, preclude the response from acting as a
counteroffer.
Assume, for example, that a buyer orders 1000 widgets from a
seller at $5.00 each. The seller responds with an acknowledgment
form that accepts the dickered terms of the offer (price, quantity,
delivery date) but contains additional terms and makes accept-
ance expressly conditional on the buyer's assent to those terms.
Under section 2-207(1) no contract results, assuming that the court
gives effect to the conditional assent language.
Suppose, however, that despite the failure of the writings to
create a contract, the seller ships the goods and the buyer accepts
and pays for them. Then, after delivery and payment, the buyer
encounters difficulties relating to the quality of the goods. What
are the warranty terms of the contract if the buyer's form contains
broad warranty provisions, while the seller's form contains a dis-
claimer of warranties? Superficially, the answer appears simple;
section 2-207(3) seems to address this contingency directly:
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a
contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the
writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In
such case the terms of the particular contract consist of those
terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with
any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provi-
46. A difficult question under § 2-207(1) is whether a response constituting a definite
and seasonable expression of acceptance can also be expressly conditional on the offeror's
assent to any different or additional terms. Section 2-207(l) states that "[a] definite and
seasonable expression of acceptance. . . operates as an acceptance even though it states
terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is
expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or difjerent terms." U.C.C. § 2-207 (1)
(emphasis added). This language is subject to at least two different interpretations. The
drafters may be merely illustrating one instance in which one cannot characterize an other-
wise definite and seasonable expression of acceptance as such because it is expressly condi-
tional. Alternatively, a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance containing the
conditional language may remain a definite and seasonable expresson of acceptance, but
not "operate as an acceptance" to bind the parties legally. In other words, the drafters may
have established a new category of response: the "conditional acceptance." This should be
distinguished from a "nonacceptance" which is a response that is not a definite and season-
able expression of acceptance and does not contain language of conditional assent. See
supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
Resolving this interpretational difficulty is important to a proper analysis of § 2-207(3).
See infra text accompanying notes 164-68. The difference in interpretation, however, does
not affect whether a contract exists upon an exchange of forms. Under both interpreta-
tions, the offeree's expressly conditional response does not "operate as an acceptance" and
form a contract.
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sions of this Act.47
Applying subsection (3) to the example, the conflicting warranty
terms drop out and the implied warranties of the Code govern the
seller's responsibilities as to the quality of the goods.
A. Dean Murray's Position
Dean John Murray points out in two articles dealing with sec-
tion 2-207 that the application of subsection (3) is not as simple as
it first appears.4" In one article, Dean Murray poses the following
hypothetical. Buyer sends a purchase order for 1000 widgets at
$5.00 per widget. Seller responds in a writing which states:
"I must receive $7.00 each for my widgets, and I am willing to
supply them on that basis. I realize that you need the widgets
now and, therefore I am shipping them today. If you do not
wish to pay $7.00 each for them, do not accept them when they
arrive."' 5
The widgets are then sent and accepted. Murray feels that the
application of subsection (3) to determine the terms of the contract
resulting from the conduct of the parties produces an absurd re-
sult." Applying subsection (3) to the hypothetical, the price term
is neither $5.00 nor $7.00, but a reasonable price. Murray suggests
that the better approach gives the seller the benefit of the last shot.
The resulting contract should be on the seller's terms-the same
result as under the common law.5'
Dean Murray's hypothetical, while somewhat unrealistic, is
compelling. As he suggests, it seems absurd to believe that the
drafters of section 2-207 intended subsection (3) to resolve this hy-
pothetical. Yet this conclusion is not apparent from the language
of subsection (3), which seems to apply equally to the Murray hy-
pothetical and the warranty conflict example previously
discussed.52
47. U.C.C. § 2-207(3).
48. Intention Over Terms, supra note 2, at 334-41; Incipient Unconscionability, supra
note 2, at 623-34.
49. Intention Over Terms, supra note 2, at 335-36.
50. Id. at 337.
51. Id.
52. See supra text accompanying note 47. In both situations, the conduct of the par-
ties, not the writings, establishes a contract. The seller shipped goods which the writings
did not require it to ship and the buyer accepted goods which the writings did not require it
to accept. The establishment of a contract by the conduct of the parties, rather than by
their writings, is the only literal requirement of subsection (3).
Dean Murray argues that when an offeree makes a clear counteroffer, subsection (3)
should not apply because the conduct of both parties did not form the contract. Rather, the
[Vol. 33:327
FORMAL APPROA4 CH TO SECTION 2-207
Dean Murray's articles provide valuable insight into the prac-
tical limitations of subsection (3) often ignored by other commen-
tators. 3 In addition, they establish a means for determining
whether an offeree made a counteroffer and the effect of subse-
quent performance by the parties if a counteroffer was made. In
the course of this analysis, Dean Murray attempts to delineate the
proper boundaries of subsection (3). The end result is a method-
ology that departs little from the common law and gives an ex-
ceedingly narrow scope to subsection (3).54 This sharply contrasts
with the view of a number of recent commentators who interpret
the Code to give subsection (3) a very broad scope."
Dean Murray's analysis begins with the premise that the "criti-
cal assumption underlying [section 2-207 is that] there are certain
undickered terms to which reasonable parties to a contract pay no
attention."56 It then agrees that section 2-207 should permit an
offeree's response to operate as an acceptance even though it con-
tains terms different from or additional to those on the offeror's
form, so long as the response is a definite and seasonable expres-
sion of acceptance.- 7 As to whether the response constitutes this
expression of acceptance, Murray's analysis suggests that one
should determine the issue from the perspective of a reasonable
offeror receiving the response. 8 That is, would a reasonable of-
feror receiving the response believe that a deal has been closed, or
would he understand that the offeree will only proceed if the 6f-
feror assents to the additional or different terms? In the former
case, a contract occurs upon the exchange of forms, whereas in the
latter case, one does not.59 Responses that are not acceptances are
offeree's written counteroffer and the offeror's conduct in accepting the goods formed the
contract. Incipient Unconscionability, supra note 2, at 626. This interpretation ignores the
fact that without the conduct of the offeree in shipping the goods there would have been no
goods for the offeror to accept. Further, there is no reason to limit the scope of the term
"conduct" to nonexpressive conduct. Thus, the sending of the counteroffer constitutes con-
duct by the offeree which, when combined with the conduct of the offeror, forms a contract.
53. See, e.g., Barron & Dunfee, supra note 2, at 194-99, 201. Barron and Dunfee
conclude that subsection (3) should apply when the offeree does not give a definite and
seasonable expression of acceptance and shipment and acceptance of the goods later oc-
curs. In reaching this conclusion, they do not consider problems of the type suggested by
Dean Murray's hypothetical.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 133-41.
55. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 2, at 441-42, 447.
56. Incipient Unconscionabilily, supra note 2, at 605.
57. Intention Over Terms, supra note 2, at 235.
58. Incpient Unconscionabilify, supra note 2, at 613.
59. Id. at 612.
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either flat rejections or counteroffers.6"
Up to this point, Dean Murray's analysis is thoroughly con-
ventional. Next, he considers the question of an offeree's reply
form that appears to be a definite and seasonable expression of
acceptance but contains the conditional language of 2-207(1).
Murray strenuously argues that the presence of such language
does not alter the analysis: "[Tihe question remains, does such an
offeror reasonably understand that the reply intends to close the
deal, or should he understand the reply as a counter-offer?"'"
Murray believes that the analysis does not change because an ac-
ceptance effectively conditioned on assent to different or addi-
tional terms is simply not an acceptance. The presence of
conditional language is simply one of many possible factors which
indicate that a reasonable offeror receiving the offeree's form
would believe that the parties closed a deal. If a reasonable of-
feror would believe a contract exists despite the existence of such
language, the provision is given no effect and the exchange of
forms creates a contract on the offeror's terms. However, if the
language is sufficient, either alone or in conjunction with other
circumstances, to lead a reasonable offeror to believe that a deal
was not closed, the exchange of forms does not produce a contract.
The final stage of Dean Murray's analysis represents the most
radical departure from the cases and scholarly analysis. To Dean
Murray, if a reasonable offeror would consider a reply to be a
counteroffer, either because of the conditional language or for
some other reason, it is a counteroffer.6 z More importantly, it is a
counteroffer that, in the usual case, the offeror accepts by its accept-
ance of the goods shipped by the offeree .63 According to estab-
lished contract doctrine, parties generally can accept counteroffers
60. Id. According to Murray, a response also may be "ambiguous." In this situation,
§ 2-207(3) would apply. See infra text accompanying notes 133-43.
61. Incipient Unconscionability, supra note 2, at 613. This conclusion is based on Mur-
ray's interpretation of the § 2-207(1) proviso. He maintains that the use of the term "ac-
ceptance" in the proviso is an "unfortunate phraseology." Id. at 610. To Murray, the term
"reply" would be more accurate, since a response with a conditional assent clause may or
may not operate as an acceptance, depending on the interpretation of the reasonable of-
feror. An effective conditional assent clause is not an acceptance but a counteroffer. Id.
This stage of Murray's analysis differs from the approach of most commentators. The ma-
jority would give effect to conditional assent language and find that the exchange of forms
did not produce a contract, at least when such language is conspicuous. See infra text
accompanying notes 68-82.
62. Incipient Unconscionability, supra note 2, at 620.
63. Id.
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by performance as well as expression.' Dean Murray sees no ba-
sis in section 2-207 or its history for believing that the drafters
intended to change this result.65 He would not consider section 2-
207(3) relevant to the analysis.
Dean Murray concedes that the decided cases provide little
support for his analysis.66 In addition, there is virtually no sup-
port in the voluminous commentary on section 2-207. The cases
and commentary are unusually consistent in concluding that sec-
tion 2-207(3) substantially alters the common law theory that ac-
ceptance of a counteroffer can occur by acceptance of the goods.67
B. The Commentary
No major treatise on the Code accepts the position that an of-
feree's response that otherwise looks like a definite and seasonable
expression of acceptance, but contains the conditional language of
section 2-207(1), must act either as an acceptance or as a counter-
offer that the offeror can accept by performance. Professors White
and Summers would clearly allow section 2-207(3) to govern such
a case.68 Professors Hawkland and Nordstrom would apparently
reach the same result, at least in some cases.69 Professors Duesen-
berg and King would only enforce a conditional assent clause if it
were conspicuous by Code definition; however, if the parties per-
formed and the clause was conspicuous, subsection (3) would de-
termine the terms of the contract.70 Professor Anderson would
also apply subsection (3) in these circumstances,7 1 as would Pro-
fessor Farnsworth.72  Law review commentary proceeds along
similar lines. For example, Professor E. Hunter Taylor broadly
applies subsection (3).73 Taylor believes that if an offeree ex-
64. Banks v. Crescent Lumber & Shingle Co., 61 Wash. 2d 528, 379 P.2d 203 (1963); 1
A. CORBIN, supra note 35, at 380.
65. Incipient Unconscionability, supra note 2, at 620-21.
66. Id. at 621-45.
67. This is true at least in situations where the exchange of forms fails to create a
contract due to the presence of a conditional assent clause in the offeree's form.
68. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 32, at 34.
69. 1 W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 1.0902-03, at 13-15 (1964); R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES
102 (1970).
70. 3 R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, SALES & BULK TRANSFERS UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 3.0613], [4] (1982).
71. 2 R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-207:13, at
277-78 (3d ed. 1982).
72. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, at 163-65.
73. See Taylor, supra note 2, at 441-42, 447.
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pressly conditions its acceptance on the offeror's assent to the ad-
ditional or different terms and the conditional assent clause is not
conspicuous, a court might justifiably reach one of two results. It
might determine that the conditional nature of the acceptance was
"so ineffectively communicated as to be unconscionable and thus,
inoperative."74 Thus, it would operate as an acceptance binding
the offeree to all of the offeror's terms except immaterial addi-
tional terms, and perhaps immaterial different terms. 75 Taylor,
however, believes that a court would more likely give effect to the
conditional assent clause, thus precluding the formation of a con-
tract upon the exchange of forms. If the parties perform, subsec-
tion (3) would govern the content of the contract.76 Clearly, this
result is quite different from that which Dean Murray would
reach.
Where the conditional language of the acceptance is conspicu-
ous, Taylor again reaches a result at odds with Murray's analysis.
If Murray finds the conspicuous nature of the term sufficient to
preclude an acceptance, it immediately becomes a counteroffer
subject to acceptance by performance; i.e., the seller has the bene-
fit of the common law last shot doctrine.77 Professor Taylor, how-
ever, would be very hesitant to allow the offeree the benefit of the
last shot doctrine under these circumstances. As a general matter,
where a conditional assent clause prevents contract formation,
Taylor would rely upon subsection (3) to determine the substan-
tive contract terms on which the writings differed if the parties
subsequently performed. Only if the offeree conditionally accepts
other than by standard form might Taylor willingly view it as a
counteroffer subject to acceptance by the offeror's acceptance of
the goods.78
In their analysis of section 2-207, Barron and Dunfee also ex-
plore the problem of conditional acceptances. They suggest that
courts should only enforce conspicuous conditional assent
clauses.79 If, however, a court enforces such a clause, "the best the
offeree can hope for is a nonpreferential contract to be formed
under subsection (3),' 's° unless the parties have actually bargained
74. Id. at 439.
75. See supra note 32.
76. Taylor, supra note 2, at 439.
77. Intention Over Terms, supra note 2, at 343.
78. Taylor, supra note 2, at 440--41.
79. Barron & Dunfee, supra note 2, at 182-84.
80. Id. at 184.
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and resolve the disagreement in their forms. Barron and Dunfee,
like Taylor, support a broad reading of subsection (3).
The bulk of student and practitioner commentary contains the
same analysis. Again, a number of the notes and comments sug-
gest that a conditional assent clause must be conspicuous to be
effective.8 1 But once a court gives the clause effect, the analysis is
strikingly uniform. When the conditional assent clause exists in
the context of an exchange of forms, subsection (3) governs the
substantive terms of the contract.8 2
C. The Cases
Numerous cases address conditional assent clauses and the in-
terpretation and application of section 2-207(3) to such clauses.
The earlier decisions adopted an approach similar to that sug-
gested by the bulk of the scholarly commentary. Consequently,
these cases were the primary targets of Dean Murray's strong
criticism.
The initial section 2-207 cases which followed the infamous
case of Roto-Lith, Ltd v. P.P. Bartlett & Co ,83 did not present the
issue of the scope of section 2-207(3) in the context of conditional
assent clauses. In Construction Aggregates Corp. v. Hewitt-Robins,
Inc. ,84 a buyer sent a purchase order to a seller for a conveyor
system. The seller responded by returning an executed acceptance
copy of the purchase order along with a letter predicating its ac-
ceptance upon certain changes in the purchase order. The changes
included a different, less comprehensive warranty clause and a
clause limiting seller's liability for lost profits and consequential
damages. Shortly after receipt of the letter, the buyer's treasurer
telephoned the seller's representative to request only a change in
the terms of payment contained in the seller's letter. By return
letter, the seller agreed to this change. The buyer requested no
other modifications.
The conveyor system failed to operate properly and a lawsuit
ensued. The scope of warranty liability was a primary issue in the
case. In deciding which correspondence controlled this question,
the Seventh Circuit concluded that the seller's letter was an ac-
81. See, e.g., New Rules, supra note 2, at 212; Nonconforming Acceptances, supra note
2, at 548.
82. See, e.g., First Shot, supra note 2, at 386; New Rules, supra note 2, at 213.
83. 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962); see supra note 24.
84. 404 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 921 (1969).
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ceptance expressly conditioned on assent to its terms.8 5 This effec-
tively precluded the purchase order form from controlling.8 6 The
court found that the buyer had impliedly assented to the warranty
and remedy terms of the letter by its failure to object to them
when it had explicitly objected to the payment terms.87 Conse-
quently, the warranty terms of the seller's letter prevailed.
Since the buyer had assented to the seller's additional or differ-
ent terms, the court found no reason to apply subsection (3). The
court did suggest that subsection (3) would have been the appro-
priate vehicle for determining the warranty and remedy terms if
there had been a simple exchange of the purchase order and letter,
and no subsequent events other than shipment and acceptance of
the conveyor.88 This dicta in Construction Aggregates is consistent
with the commentary discussed earlier.89 The decision prompted
Dean Murray to question why an expression of assent implied
from the offeror's language results in a contract on the offeree's
terms, whereas implied assent by conduct, through acceptance of
the goods, would apparently result in a contract with terms gov-
erned by subsection (3).90
The 1972 Sixth Circuit decision in Dorton v. Collins & Aikman
Corp. 91 also failed to provide a definitive interpretation of the
scope of section 2-207(3). Although the printed acknowledgment
85. Id. at 509. This determination brought the acceptance within the ambit of the last
clause of § 2-207(l).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 510.
88. Id. at 509.
89. See supra notes 68-82 and accompanying text.
90. Incipient Unconscionability, supra note 2, at 625-26. "To require a language ac-
ceptance of the counter-offer in order to make the terms of the counter-offer operative is
not supported by the language of the statute. . . [and] would be antithetical to the perva-
sive values of good faith, reasonable commercial understanding and conscionability." Id.
at 626. For a discussion of Dean Murray's objection to the court's decision in Construction
Aggregates, see infra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
One should note how distant the case is from a simple battle of the forms and therefore,
difficult to use in determining the proper scope of subsection (3) as it applies in a typical
context. First, the seller's response was not by form but by letter. Some writers suggest that
this alone makes the application of § 2-207 unnecessary. Taylor, supra note 2, at 440, notes
that letters differ substantially from printed forms and do not fit within the typical battle of
forms situation to which the drafters primarily intended § 2-207 to apply. Second, the
parties did not simply perform but directly communicated after the exchange of the offer
and conditional acceptance. Finally, at least some of this communication was between
persons of authority in the respective companies, rather than between lower level shipping
and receiving employees, as in the usual § 2-207 case. See Taylor, supra note 2, at 441.
None of this, however, resolves the question posed by Murray.
91. 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972).
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forms sent in response to oral offers stated that "[t]he acceptance
of your order is subject to all of the terms and conditions on the
reverse side," 92 the court held that the offeree did not expressly
condition its acceptance on the offeror's assent to the additional or
different terms on the acknowledgment forms. Therefore, the re-
sponses operated as an acceptance, creating a contract under 2-
207(l). 91 The court then applied section 2-207(2) to determine if
the additional or different terms became part of the contract. Like
the Seventh Circuit in Construction Aggregates, the Sixth Circuit
suggested in dicta that it would have been appropriate to apply
subsection (3) to determine the terms of the contract if the offeree
had expressly conditioned acceptance on the assent of the of-
feror.94 Again, Dean'Murray voiced his strenuous objection to
this suggestion.95
Except for a New York trial court decision which reached a
result consistent with the dicta in Construction Aggregates and
Dorton,96 the cases shed little light on the issue of the scope of
section 2-207(3) in the context of a conditional acceptance until
1977, when the Seventh Circuit decided C Itoh & Co. (America) v.
Jordan International Co."7 Itoh involved a classic battle of the
forms with none of the complications of Construction Aggregates
and Dorton. Moreover, the court could not avoid the issue of the
application of section 2-207(3) where the offeree's response was a
conditional accceptance.
Itoh (the buyer) submitted a purchase order for steel coils to
Jordan (the seller). The seller responded with an acknowledg-
ment form containing on its face a provision stating: "Seller's ac-
ceptance is, however, expressly conditional on Buyer's assent to
the additional or different terms and conditions set forth below
and printed on the reverse side. If these terms and conditions are
not acceptable, Buyer should notify Seller at once." 98 The ac-
knowledgment form contained a provision for arbitration on its
reverse side. The buyer neither expressly assented nor objected to
any terms on the seller's form. After delivery and acceptance, the
coils were discovered to be defective. The buyer brought suit and
92. Id. at 1164.
93. Id. at 1168.
94. Id. at 1169 n.6.
95. Incipient Unconscionability, supra note 2, at 634.
96. Tunis Mfg. v. Allen Knitting Mills, 87 Misc. 2d 1091, 386 N.Y.S.2d 911 (Sup. Ct.
1976).
97. 552 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1977).
98. Id. at 1230.
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the seller sought a stay pending arbitration, as required by its
clause.
The court concluded that the language in the acknowledgment
form was an acceptance expressly conditioned on the offeror's as-
sent to the additional or different terms on the acknowledgment.99
As a result, the acknowledgment form operated as a counteroffer.
Contrary to common law, however, the acceptance of the goods
did not constitute an acceptance of the counteroffer. Rather, since
the exchange of forms did not create a contract, the court held that
section 2-207(3) operated to create one as the parties' conduct rec-
ognized the existence of a contract.'0° As required by subsection
(3), the terms of the contract were those on which the writings
agreed, together with the terms supplied by the Code."10
Itoh is consistent with the suggestions of Construction Aggre-
gates and Dorton. In an analysis of the effects of its holding, the
court concluded that its interpretation resulted in no unfairness to
either party.102  This interpretation also permits the offeree to
make an informed and reasoned response to an offeror's order. In
short, it provides both fairness and predictability. Significantly,
Dean Murray hardly questioned the opinion on either of these
grounds.
Since Itoh and the publication of Dean Murray's articles in
99. Id. at 1235.
100. Id. at 1236.
101. No analysis differs more from Dean Murray's than the one advocated in Itoh.
Consequently, he strongly criticizes Itoh as the "denouement" of the misguided approach
suggested by dicta in Construction Aggregates and Dorton. Incipient Unconscionability,
supra note 2, at 635-39. According to Murray, the court did not consider whether Itoh
actually read and understood, or should have read and understood, the conditional nature
of the acceptance. It also failed to discuss why the conditional language was sufficient to
make the response a counteroffer. Also absent was a discussion of why Itoh's performance
was not a reasonable mode of accepting the alleged counteroffer. Murray feels that a dis-
cussion of these issues is necessary for a proper analysis. Id. at 638.
102. 552 F.2d at 1237-38. The court reasoned that a seller's use the conditional lan-
guage of§ 2-207(1) preserves its ability to walk away from the transaction if the buyer does
not expressly assent to its terms. The seller's response to the offer is ambiguous if it ships
the goods without such express assent. The court stated that it should not reward the seller
for injecting ambiguity into the transaction by incorporating its additional terms into the
contract. If the terms are crucial, the seller should defer shipment until the parties can
reach a final agreement. Id.
While this reasoning is generally sound, the court did not explain why the response
form and shipment of the goods together created an ambiguous response. Dean Murray's
hypothetical certainly suggests that a seller who responds with a counteroffer but soon
thereafter ships the goods does not always respond ambiguously. See supra notes 49-51
and accompanying text. Also, the court never considered why the express assent of the
offeror was necessary for acceptance of the counteroffer. Neither the text of§ 2-207 nor the
common law imposes this requirement. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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1969 and 1978, courts have decided 2-207 cases in a manner con-
sistent with Itoh. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Chambers Gasket & Mfg. 103 is a
case very similar to Itoh, illustrating the same mode of analysis.
The buyer (Chambers) mailed a purchase order to the seller (Uni-
royal) for material to make gaskets. The seller returned an ac-
knowledgment form stating: "'OUR ACCEPTANCE OF THE
ORDER IS CONDITIONAL ON THE BUYER'S ACCEPT-
ANCE OF THE CONDITIONS OF SALE PRINTED ON THE
REVERSE SIDE HEREOF. IF BUYER DOES NOT ACCEPT
THESE CONDITIONS OF SALE, HE SHALL NOTIFY
SELLER IN WRITING WITHIN SEVEN (7) DAYS AFTER
RECEIPT OF THIS ACKNOWLEDGMENT.""' The reverse
side of the form contained a warranty disclaimer. The buyer
neither expressly assented nor objected to the seller's acknowledg-
ment. The material proved to be defective. Chambers was sued
by its buyer and sought indemnification from Uniroyal for breach
of warranty.
The court found that the acknowledgment form constituted an
acceptance which was expressly conditional on the buyer's assent
to the additional terms.'05 Thus, the exchange of forms did not
create a contract. Since the record revealed no manifestation of
the buyer's assent to the terms on the seller's form, only the per-
formance of both parties could create a contract. 0 6 The court
held that the seller's shipment of the goods and the buyer's accept-
ance constituted sufficient performance to establish a contract,
with the terms being those agreed upon by the parties and those
supplied by the Code, as mandated by section 2-207(3). 107
103. 177 Ind. App. 508, 380 N.E.2d 571 (1978).
104. Id. at 510, 380 N.E.2d at 573.
105. Id. at 516, 380 N.E.2d at 577.
106. Id. at 518, 380 N.E.2d at 578.
107. Id.
In two recent cases, an Illinois appellate court applied an analysis consistent with Itoh
and Uniroyal. However, the decisions carry diminished precedential force because both
concluded that subsection (3) determines the terms of a contract when shipment and ac-
ceptance of goods follows a conditional acceptance, either in dicta or as an alternative
holding. See Album Graphics, Inc. v. Beatrice Foods Co., 87 Ill. App. 3d 338, 347-48, 408
N.E.2d 1041, 1048 (1980) (alternative holding); Tecumseh Int'l Corp. v. City of Springfield,
70 Ill. App. 3d 101, 105, 388 N.E.2d 460, 463 (1979) (dicta). Album Graphics is a particu-
larly interesting illustration of how these cases differ from Dean Murray's analysis. In that
case, plaintiff had ordered glue from defendant. Defendant sent the glue accompanied by
invoices which disclaimed implied warranties and included the following language: "If the
buyer does not accept our products on these terms, they are to be returned at once, un-
opened." 87 I11. App. 3d at 341,408 N.E.2d at 1044. Plaintiff used the glue, which turned
out to be defective, and then sued for breach of express and implied warranties.
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Similarly, in the recent case of Leonard Pevar Co. v. Evans
Products Co. ,t08 the court concluded that subsection (3) governed
the terms of the contract and, effect to a conditional assent clause
in the seller's form. In this case, the buyer had sent a purchase
order form for plywood which contained no language concerning
warranties. The seller responded with an acknowledgment form
disclaiming the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness,
and severely limiting the buyer's remedies for breach of any ex-
press warranty. The acknowledgment form also contained lan-
guage making acceptance expressly conditional on the buyer's
assent to the terms contained in the form. Nonetheless, the seller
shipped the plywood and the buyer accepted it. The plywood
later proved to be defective and the buyer brought an action for
breach of express and implied warranties. The seller defended
based on the disclaimer in its acknowledgment form, arguing that
the conditional assent language created a counteroffer which the
buyer had accepted by its acceptance of the goods. 0 9
The court agreed that the exchange of forms did not produce a
The appellate court accepted the trial court's finding that the invoice language was
conspicuous by Code definition. Id. at 343, 408 N.E.2d at 1045. The court concluded that
if no oral contract preceded the exchange of writings, the terms on the invoice "arguably"
made acceptance expressly conditional on acceptance of the new terms and operated as a
counteroffer. Then, if the parties went on to perform, thereby recognizing the existence of
a contract, a contract would be formed with terms supplied under § 2-207(3). Id. at
347-48, 408 N.E.2d at 1048. The Code would include an implied warranty of
merchantability as a supplementary term under § 2-314(1).
The case has some significant similarities to Dean Murray's hypothetical. See supra
text accompanying note 49. In both situations, the seller responded to an offer by shipping
goods and with a writing which provided additional or different terms. The seller specifi-
cally indicated that if the buyer did not agree to these terms, it should return the goods.
Finally, the buyer accepted the goods in both situations. Dean Murray considers the appli-
cation of subsection (3) to this fact pattern "absurd." See supra text accompanying note 50.
Yet that is precisely what the court did in Album Graphics.
Admittedly, significant differences exist between Dean Murray's hypothetical and Al-
bum Graphics. In Murray's hypothetical, the new terms were sent by letter, rather than in
an invoice accompanying the goods. For a discussion of the significance of this distinction,
see Taylor, supra note 2, at 440. In Album Graphics, the court noted that the form's dis-
claimer was in small print. While these facts may justify different results in the two situa-
tions, one cannot ignore the crucial aspect of the court's analysis: the assumption that the
invoice constituted a counteroffer. Once this assumption is made, the problem presented is
essentially the same as Dean Murray's hypothetical-either the accceptance of the goods
constitutes acceptance of the terms of the offeree's counteroffer, or subsection (3) governs
the terms of the resulting contract. Although the assumption may have been erroneous,
once it was made reconciliation of the approaches of the Album Graphics court and Dean
Murray became impossible.
108. 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 720 (D. Del. 1981).
109. Id. at 723-24.
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contract, 110 since the seller expressly conditioned its acceptance on
the buyer's assent to the additional or different terms on its
form.t I 1 However, it rejected the argument that acceptance of the
goods constituted acceptance of the counteroffer, stating:
The drafters of the Code, however, intended to change the
common law in an attempt to conform contract law to modem
day business transactions. They believed that businessmen
rarely read the terms on the back of standardized forms and
that the common law, therefore, unduly rewarded the party
who sent the last form prior to the shipping of the goods. The
Code disfavors any attempt by one party to unilaterally impose
conditions that would create hardship on another party. Thus,
before a counteroffer is accepted, the counter-offeree must ex-
pressly assent to the new terms." 2
Instead, the court utilized subsection (3) to find the terms of the
contract." 13
D. Murray Revisited
This author is unaware of any decided cases in which a court
has adopted an analysis similar to Dean Murray's. Yet Murray's
analysis and arguments are significant and interesting. Virtually
no commentary, save perhaps one article, 1 4 addresses the trouble-
some questions he raises. Murray is correct in his view that com-
mentators and courts proceed on the basis of assumptions about 2-
207 which they rarely acknowledge and virtually never support or
defend. The examples in Murray's articles certainly indicate that
one can interpret the language of section 2-207(3) to reach in-
defensible results." 15 Dean Murray's approach also presents some
very substantial problems which probably explain the failure of
courts and other Code experts to accept it.
Dean Murray's method of applying 2-207 has some decided
110. Id. at 729. The court indicated that the parties may have formed an oral contract
prior to the exchange of forms.
11. The court gave effect to the conditional assent clause depsite the fact that it was
"on the reverse side of the acknowledgment and in boilerplate fashion." Id. at 723. It
neither discussed whether a reasonable offeror would have seen the language (the keystone
of Murray's analysis), nor indicated concern over the apparent inconspicuousness of the
clause when it decided that the language resulted in a counteroffer. If the decision in Itoh
raised Dean Murray's hackles, one can only imagine the effect of Leonard Pevar.
112. Id. at 728-29 (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 730. For a recent case which apparently produced similar results, see Jos-
tens, Inc. v. National Computer Sys., 318 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. 1982).
114. Taylor, supra note 2. Since Professor Taylor's article preceded Murray's second
article, he does not respond to all of Murray's arguments and concerns.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 48-52.
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advantages over the approaches suggested by other commentators
and applied in the cases. It presents a principled means of resolv-
ing cases involving more than the mere exchange of printed forms
which others assume section 2-207(3) does not govern, but which
seem to clearly fall within its language." 6 Furthermore, Murray
bases his solution on section 2-207. Those who use approaches
other than 2-207(3) offer the somewhat lame and generally unsup-
ported excuse that section 2-207 may not govern nonform
transactions. 11 7
Dean Murray's approach is symmetrical and uncomplicated to
apply. Its touchstone is a single, uncomplicated factual inquiry,
from which all else flows with compelling logic. The difficult
questions that those choosing the Itoh approach must confront
disappear with the application of Murray's method. For example,
it is unnecessary to determine whether the transaction is a form
transaction, or whether a "conditional acceptance" has a different
effect than a "nonacceptance."' 8 Dean Murray's view is thus
preferable solely on the basis of its simplicity.
Murray's approach is a less significant departure from tradi-
tional contract doctrine than the positions taken by the courts and
commentators. Although his interpretation of 2-207 accounts for
the change in the common law mirror image rule, as the drafters
intended, 19 it does not alter the common law beyond the face of
the provision itself. He finds "no legislative history or language in
the section or comments to 2-207 which suggests" that 2-207
changed the law affecting true counteroffers. 20  On the other
hand, the varying approaches taken by other commentators sub-
stantially erode the well established common law rule that a party
can accept a counteroffer, like any other offer, by performance as
well as expression. In fact, some seem virtually to eliminate the
rule by applying subsection (3) when the offeree's response is a
nonacceptance as well as when it is a conditional acceptance. 12
There are numerous advantages and arguments which support
116. For an example of this type of situation, see supra text accompanying note 49.
117. See, e.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 32, at 36-37; Taylor, supra note 2,
at 440-41.
118. See supra note 46.
119. That is, it permits a response which contains terms additional to or different from
those in the offer to operate as an acceptance. See supra text accompanying note 57.
120. Incipient Unconscionability, supra note 2, at 620-21.
121. See, e.g., Barron & Dunfee, supra note 2, at 184. "Yet, even if the offeree is suc-
cessful in making a counter-proposal, the best the offeree can hope for is a nonpreferential
contract to be formed under subsection (3). ... Id.
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Dean Murray's approach. Yet despite the powerful articulation of
Murray's thesis, this author remains unconvinced that his method-
ology represents the proper approach to section 2-207 for many
important reasons. Dean Murray's approach largely ignores the
business reality that prompted the drafting of section 2-207. The
drafters desired the Code and section 2-207 to reflect current busi-
ness practices.12 2 One prevalent practice is the transaction of busi-
ness by printed forms. 23 Scholarly commentary articulates the
advantages of form or standardized single-document contracts 2 4
which are probably more applicable to contracts formed by sepa-
rate offer and acceptance documents.
Standardized purchase and ackowledgment forms possess sev-
eral economic advantages. They drastically reduce the costs of
negotiating and drafting a separate agreement for every transac-
tion. The ability to reduce such costs is particulary important to
large firms engaged in many transactions with numerous parties.
Minimally, the standard form enables the sender to specify a par-
ticular position on a problem. More importantly, the use of stan-
dard forms permits at least one of the parties, usually the offeree
at common law, to insert collateral terms in an agreement at low
cost, to which the other party would not object if the terms were
the subject of actual negotiation. Under any reasonable reading
of section 2-207, offerors are given a similar capacity.'2 5 The use
of forms also permits large, multicustomer firms to use lower level
staff to conduct routine business. At a relatively low cost, these
employees can be taught standard procedures for ordering or
processing orders for materials and services. Perhaps the strongest
proof of the economic advantages of form transactions is that
prior to the adoption of section 2-207, reliance upon form orders
122. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b); see Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621, 623 (1975); Report of Committee on the Proposed
Commercial Code, 6 Bus. LAW. 119, 126 (1951); Taylor, supra note 2, at 420.
123. See, e.g., Non-Contractual Relations, supra note 11, at 55, 58.
124. See, e.g., K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION-DECIDING APPEALS
362 (1960).
125. At common law, shipment and acceptance of goods following an offeree's re-
sponse which contained additional terms would likely result in a contract on the offeree's
terms. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Section 2-207 provides that a definite and
seasonable expression of acceptance containing additional or different terms results in an
acceptance of the terms contained on the offeror's form. If the offeror successfully limits
acceptance to the terms of the offer, even immaterial terms do not become part of the
contract. The Code thus increases the likelihood that a contract may be formed on the
offeror's terms.
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by offerors apparently increased as firm size increased. 126 This oc-
curred despite the existence of the last shot doctrine which favored
offerees.
Dean Murray's approach neither recognizes this business real-
ity nor accommodates the efficiencies which result from the use of
forms. His approach would inquire in every case whether a rea-
sonable offeror would believe that the offeree intends to close the
deal by its response. If so, the response concludes the deal on the
offeror's terms, subject to the possible addition of nonmaterial
terms appearing on the offeree's form. Murray believes that this
effects the intention of the parties. Yet an acknowledgment which
a reasonable offeror believes closes the deal does not necessarily
indicate the offeree's intent to accept all of the offeror's terms.
The offeree simply may have chosen a form method, such as a
conditional assent clause, to object to the offeror's nondickered
terms, rather than objection on a costly, term-by-term basis. This
is especially true when an offeree must process hundreds of differ-
ent offer forms, each with its own fine print. Nevertheless, be-
cause in most cases it makes no difference whose form controls,
the offeree's form and its subsequent conduct in shipping the
goods indicate a willingness to proceed in the face of uncertainty.
This willingness to proceed, however, should not militate against
the offeree. The offeror, by its acceptance of the goods, displays a
similar willingness to proceed despite the receipt of a form which
it must know usually contains some terms additional to or differ-
ent from the terms on its form. Like the offeree, however, it does
not intend to be bound by the terms on the offeree's form.
127
126. See Resnick, Conflicting Boiler Plate-Effect of the Uniform Commercial Code, 18
Bus. LAW. 401, 401 (1963).
127. The fact that neither party intends to be bound by the terms on the other's form
does not justify a conclusion that the parties did not intend to make a contract when they
exchanged forms. Baird and Weisberg suggest that it is impossible to determine whether
the parties intended to contract despite the difference in fine print terms, since the premise
of section 2-207 is that parties are not aware that the forms contain conflicting terms. Baird
& Weisberg, supra note 2, at 1237-40. This analysis is questionable for two reasons. First,
most commercial actors are aware that the forms they send do not match the forms they
receive. In fact, given the nature of modem day purchase and acknowledgment forms, it is
highly unlikely that the boilerplate on the buyer's form would exactly match that contained
on the seller's acknowledgment form. Therefore, it is unlikely that buyers and sellers
would believe otherwise. See Non-Contractual Relations, supra note 11, at 60; Use and
Non-Use of Contracts, supra note 11, at 24; supra note 13. Second, the relevant inquiry
should be whether the parties intended to be bound, knowing that they were unaware of
the terms on the other's form-not whether they would have intended to be bound had
they been aware of the discrepancy in the fine print terms on the forms. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-
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As noted by Professor Taylor, 2 8 Murray's approach proceeds
as if one of the two documents fully represents the true intent of
the parties, when neither document actually represents their intent
(either subjective or objective). In today's business environment,
especially when dealing with large firms, each party knows that its
form's nondickered terms differ from those on most of the forms it
receives. Moreover, each party is aware that its form contains a
formal objection to the terms on the other party's form. Dean
Murray's approach, however, tends to produce both a clear win-
ner and a clear loser, even though both parties completed the
transaction with almost certain knowledge that the forms did not
agree. If the offeree's response appears enough like a true
counteroffer, all of the terms on its form become part of the con-
tract under the last shot approach of traditional contract law. But
if the response looks like an acceptance, a contract exists on the
offeror's terms, with the possibility of nonmaterial additions from
the offeree's form. This winner-takes-all approach seems inappro-
priate when the parties typically pay little attention to the boiler-
plate on either form and consequently do not expect their
boilerplate to become part of the contract.
In addition, Murray appears to suggest that an appropriate
finding of a clear counteroffer requires a nonform response.129 If
this follows, then section 2-207 substantially erodes any economic
advantages to the offeree of communicating and transacting in the
form mode. An offeree that receives a large number of order
forms from offerors should not have to make a phone call or send
a telegram to avoid the potentially one-sided terms of the offeror's
form. In fact, offerees will not respond in this manner simply be-
cause it is too costly and time consuming to examine each form in
minute detail and then object in a nonroutine manner, in the un-
likely event that problems may result. An offeree should have the
ability to respond in a manner that preserves its ability to avoid
being bound by one-sided fine print terms on the offeror's form,
without delaying the transaction or incurring extra costs.
If, on the other hand, merely printing a conditional assent
clause on a form is sufficient to constitute a clear counteroffer, the
problem changes. One cannot expect an offeror, which may re-
ceive many different acknowledgment forms from many different
204(3) (if parties intend to be bound, contract does not fail simply because they leave one
or more terms open).
128. See Taylor, supra note 2, at 443-44.
129. Incoilent Unconscionability, supra note 2, at 627-28.
19831
CASE WESTERN RESERVE L4W REVIEW
offerees, to examine each form in detail to determine if a condi-
tional assent clause exists, or if it objects to and is unwilling to
proceed because of some provision on the offeree's form. Dean
Murray recognizes this objection and it is one of his strongest crit-
icisms of the decided cases. Yet a failure to accord some degree of
effect to printed conditional assent clauses is a failure to recognize
the essential similarity between the positions of the offeror and
offeree. Both need an efficient, economical means to avoid being
bound by unexpected, one-sided, or oppressive terms supplied by
the other party; one which permits most transactions to proceed
on the basis of disagreeing forms, yet avoids unfair surprise if a
dispute arises later. The granting of the full status of a common
law counteroffer to a form response containing a conditional as-
sent clause precludes the offeror from achieving this objective.
Not giving effect to a conditional assent clause denies the same
advantage to the offeree. Thus, a rule which embodies either of
these principles is inconsistent with the efficiencies of the form
mode of contracting and contrary to the intention of the parties.
Ultimately, Dean Murray does not suggest a rule which never
gives effect to a printed conditional assent clause or which always
gives printed conditional assent clauses the effect of common law
counteroffers. Rather, he returns to his basic test:
If the reply is a printed form which contains some language
suggesting insistence on different or additional terms in the re-
ply, courts are confronted with a determination of how that
language would be understood by a reasonable offeror. ...
As to each offeror who receives such a reply, the question re-
mains, does such an offeror reasonably understand that the re-
ply intends to close the deal, or should he understand the reply
as a counter-offer? 130
As suggested above, the simplicity of the inquiry is somewhat
misleading. An offeror in today's business climate often knows, or
should know, that the offeree's form is different from its form and
that the offeree's form contains collateral terms which are
favorable to the offeree and language which attempts to make its
terms controlling. Nevertheless, the offeree's form indicates on its
face a willingness to ship the goods and the offeror usually pays
attention to nothing else. To say that an offeror in this position
might reasonably believe that the parties closed a deal and that
the offeree will ship the goods, is quite different from saying that,
despite knowledge of the probable contents of the offeree's form,
130. Id. at 612-13; see supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
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the offeror reasonably believes they closed a deal on its (the of-
feror's) terms. Yet this is precisely what occurs under Dean Mur-
ray's analysis if the offeree's form indicates that the parties closed
a deal.
Further, the factual nature of the inquiry presents almost in-
surmountable problems of uncertainty which Dean Murray
vaguely recognizes but makes little attempt to deal with. Business
people often care less about the content of the legal rule than
about having reliable knowledge of its implications. 13' Since
much of the Code and contract law is private law within the con-
trol of the parties, the ability to understand the law and predict
results based on that understanding is crucially important. Yet
Murray's analysis appears to be the antithesis of the desired cer-
tainty. To avoid inefficiencies and potential unfairness, Murray
does not make the effect of an expressly conditional acceptance
contingent upon whether the acceptance occurs on a printed form,
although this might provide some degree of predictability. Even if
the conditional assent clause is on a printed form, his central in-
quiry remains intact: would a reasonable offeree believe that the
parties closed a deal? Murray describes this as a "difficult factual
inquiry. '132 He insists that the court assume the position of the
reasonable offeror to determine whether the reply is a counteroffer
or an acceptance. Since the inquiry is a factual one, however, the
question is not one for the court at all. It is more likely that a juiry
will decide the question, as in negligence cases and others involv-
ing a reasonable person standard. To a large extent, this will pre-
clude the development of a body of law which may help to predict
results in future cases. An offeree who attempts to use its form to
preclude any oppressive terms on the offeror's form will be forced
either to forego the certainty that is so important or sacrifice effi-
ciency by responding in a nonform mode which clearly indicates
that its response is not an acceptance. Even then, the result is far
from guaranteed.
Finally, Dean Murray's analysis gives an uncertain and ques-
tionable scope to section 2-207(3). Murray limits the application
of section 2-207(3) to situations in which the writings are ambigu-
131. One reason for this lack of concern is that unless the rule bestows inalienable
rights upon one party, the parties can often bargain around it. In addition, if the law
makes certain legal results contingent upon external circumstances within the control of the
parties, they can control the results by controlling the circumstances.
132. Incoient Unconscionability, supra note 2, at 649.
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ous, and the parties have performed despite the ambiguity. 3 3 Al-
though he provides some general discussions of where ambiguity
might exist in the writings, 34 he leaves the precise meaning of the
term largely unexplored in the context of form contracts.
In one respect, ambiguity exists out of necessity in most situa-
tions involving section 2-207. After all, an offeree has responded
to an offer with something other than a flat rejection or simple
acceptance. Its response adds new or different terms to the offer
and in all probability attempts to establish a contract on its terms.
The offeree (usually the seller) often ships the goods despite the
lack of congruity between the papers exchanged, and without word
from the offeror. The offeror, on the other hand, accepts the goods
without ever resolving the problem which every experienced com-
mercial actor should be aware of: the form it received does not
match the one sent.
Of course, the offeree could make it clear that its response is a
counteroffer, and that it shipped the goods as an accommodation,
but only on its terms. Further, the offeree could plainly state that
acceptance of the goods constitutes an acceptance of its terms
only. In addition, the offeree could accomplish this in a mode
which insures that the offeror reads and understands it. This is
unlikely to occur, however, for efficiency reasons. More realisti-
cally, the offeree probably responds by sending a form which su-
perficially indicates that a deal has been struck. It also likely
contains different printed terms from those on the offeror's form
and language indicating the effect of acceptance of the goods, but
it is unlikely that the form highlights either point. Finally, the
offeree's form probably contains language limiting any resulting
contract to its terms. This provision is also printed and the person
processing the transaction will probably neither read nor under-
stand it.
Nevertheless, the language of conditional acceptance may be
considered "conspicuous" by Code defintion. 135 In addition, the
offeror knows or should know that the offeree's form differs from
133. Id. at 649-50.
134. Id. Dean Murray also provides a short discussion and example of the application
of subsection (3) in his Fordham Law Review article, but this discussion is ultimately not
very helpful. In fact, the example he uses to illustrate the proper application seems some-
what inconsistent with his entire approach to § 2-207. See Intention Over Terms, supra note
2, at 337-38.
135. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. While it is usually difficult to determine
from the facts of the case whether a conditional assent clause was conspicuous, the facts of
two recent cases suggest that the conditional assent language was conspicuous by Code
[ ol. 33:327
FORMAlL APPROACH TO SECTION 2-207
its own form t36 and may even contain language which limits the
contract to its terms. 37 Nonetheless, the offeror accepts the goods.
One could realistically describe this entire sequence of events as
ambiguous. This factual pattern appears, with slight modifica-
tions, in numerous cases. 31 If Dean Murray were to concede that
it is ambiguous and therefore properly the domain of section 2-
207(3), perhaps criticism of his approach misdirected. However,
he probably would be unwilling to make this concession, as his
thesis would lose much of its force. If Murray would apply sec-
tion 2-207(3) rather than his analysis to this fact pattern, a classic
battle of the forms, he would not be far from those he criticizes.
Presumably, considerable ambiguity would remain in the
transaction if the conditional assent language was not conspicuous
or did not track the language of 2-207(l). 139 Dean Murray would
be compelled virtually to concede his entire argument if he were
to characterize this modified fact pattern as ambiguous. This is so
because other commentators, 40 and perhaps the courts, 14 would
also not apply subsection (3) in the even more extreme situation
where a party has responded in a nonform manner and the
counteroffer nature of the response is clear. Dean Murray further
complicates the uncertainty problem by injecting a third category
of response into the factual inquiry. Under this analysis, the rea-
sonable offeror either interprets the offeree's response as a definite
and seasonable expression of acceptance, a counteroffer, or an
ambiguous response. Murray never states at what point a
counteroffer is transformed into an ambiguous response, and an
ambiguous response into an acceptance. Presumably, this is a
question for the factfinder, but such an approach offers business-
men little future guidance. Further, adding a third type of re-
definition. See C. Itoh & Co. (America) v. Jordan Int'l Co., 552 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1977);
Uniroyal, Inc. v. Chambers Gasket & Mfg., 177 Ind. App. 508, 380 N.E.2d 571 (1978).
136. See 2 1954 LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 39, at 1235; supra
note 127.
137. This is likely to be the case if the offeror is aware that its own form contains such a
provision.
138. See cases discussed supra in notes 96-113 and accompanying text.
139. Some cases suggest these requirements. See, e.g., Dorton v. Collins & Aikman
Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1168 (6th Cir. 1972).
140. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 32, at 36-37; Taylor, supra note 2, at
440-41; cf. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, at 165.
141. Cf. Koehring Co. v. Glowacki, 77 Wis. 2d 497, 253 N.W.2d 64 (1977) (exchange of
telegrams which contained different F.O.B. terms constituted offer and counteroffer). For a
discussion of this case, see Incipient Unconscionability, supra note 2, at 639-41.
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sponse increases the likelihood of unpredictable results because
more cases likely will be marginal.
Dean Murray does give one example of what he considers an
ambiguous reply: where the response "may appear to be a
counter-offer but it may still leave doubt as to whether an opera-
tive acceptance can be found through the acceptance of goods by
the offeror."' 14 2 Murray apparently envisions a situation where it is
unclear whether accepting the goods is a reasonable means of ac-
cepting the counteroffer. This is an almost impossible situation,
considering the common law and particularly section 2-206 of the
Code. At common law, courts almost always deemed the accept-
ance of shipped goods to be an appropriate means of accepting an
offeree's counteroffer. In fact, this is the genesis of the problems
caused by the last shot doctrine. Therefore, it is difficult to imag-
ine what form this ambiguity might take, apart from something so
unrealistic as a flat statement by the offeree that the offeror's ac-
ceptance of the goods may or may not constitute an acceptance of
the offeree's terms. In addition, section 2-206(l)(b) states that un-
less unambiguous/y indicated otherwise, "an order or other offer to
buy goods. . . shall be construed as inviting acceptance either by
a prompt promise to ship or by the prompt [shipment of the
goods].. 143 While section 2-206 does not deal with a seller's
counteroffer, the policy behind the section indicates that accept-
ance of the goods constitutes an acceptance of an offer to sell, un-
less unambiguously indicated otherwise. Such an indication,
however, by definition, removes the ambiguity that initially cre-
ated a potential subsection (3) case for Dean Murray.
III. SECTION 2-207(3) AND THE MERITS OF FORMALISM
The Code history does not indicate that the drafters designed
subsection (3) to deal solely with ambiguous responses. In fact,
significant evidence exists that the drafters intended a much
broader and different scope. This section explores the history of
section 2-207 in detail. It also offers an analysis of section 2-207
which avoids some of Dean Murray's objections to the decided
cases and remedies some of the disadvantages of his approach.
This analysis is not necessarily the one intended by the drafters of
section 2-207. As one scholar has noted, the history of section 2-
207 is such that ascribing any intent to the drafters is bound to be
142. Incipient Unconscionability, supra note 2, at 649.
143. U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b).
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a futile exercise.'" The suggested approach is, however, certainly
not inconsistent with either the language or the history of section
2-207. Furthermore, if adopted, it may lead to reasonable and
principled decisions in most cases.
A. The Suggested Approach
A proper approach to section 2-207 and the appropriate appli-
cation of section 2-207(3) requires a dual inquiry, rather than the
single inquiry suggested by Dean Murray. The initial question is
whether the offeree's response is a definite and seasonable expres-
sion of acceptance. A proper analysis must include this inquiry-
section 2-207 demands it. The answer to this question depends on
whether a reasonable offeror would clearly recognize the response
as a rejection or a counteroffer, rather than an acceptance. Fur-
ther, if the response is a counteroffer, a reasonable offeror must
clearly recognize that any shipment of goods following the re-
sponse is merely an accommodation, and that acceptance of the
goods constitutes acceptance of the counteroffer.
45
This test differs from Dean Murray's in that the offeree must
meet a higher standard to make a successful counteroffer that can
be accepted by the offeror's acceptance of the goods. Anything
less than a clear indication by the offeree that it has not accepted
the offer is a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance.
This approach considers an ambiguous response to be a definite
and seasonable expression of acceptance. Since the offeree in-
jected the ambiguity into the transaction by its response, it should
bear the consequences. While no standard will eliminate all un-
certainty, placing the burden on the offeree to insure that a rea-
sonable offeror would clearly recognize its response as a
counteroffer increases the degree of predictability. If an offeree
intends to make a real counteroffer and almost concurrently ships
144. See Letter from Professor Grant Gilmore to Professor Robert Summers (Sept. 10,
1980), reprinted in R. SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS & J. WHITE, TEACHING MATERIALS ON COM-
MERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW 54-55 (3d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Gilmore Letter].
145. To some extent, requiring the offeror to recognize clearly that acceptance of the
goods constitutes acceptance of the counteroffer may be overkill. It seems justified, how-
ever, in the context of the battle of the forms. While this reverses the common law pre-
sumptioi that acceptance of the goods is normally a proper mode of acceptance, one must
remember that the offeree fully controls its response. If the offeree truly believes that a
term absent from the offer is essential to the contract, it can easily make it clear to the
offeror that acceptance of the goods will constitute an acceptance of that term. Under the
analysis suggested herein, unless the response clearly provides that it is a counteroffer and
that acceptance of the goods will constitute an acceptance of all the offeree's terms, there is
a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance under § 2-207(1).
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the goods, t46 it will probably leave the form mode of transacting.
In fact, as a rule of thumb, satisfying the test suggested herein
requires the offeree to direct a letter, telegram, or telephone re-
sponse (rather than a form) to a person in the offeror's firm with
authority to negotiate the terms of the contract. 4 7 This reflects
Dean Murray's example and confirms the appropriateness of his
conclusion that subsection (3) should not control in such a
situation.
This initial inquiry does not resolve one of the central difficul-
ties with Dean Murray's analysis: how can an offeree efficiently
protect itself from potentially one-sided or unexpected terms in
the offeror's form? The answer is to allow the offeree to make a
counteroffer in a form, but in a different manner than that sug-
gested above. This is not, however, a counteroffer that the offeror
can accept by acceptance of the goods. Rather, the offeree can
only eliminate additional or different terms on the offeror's form
by including a conditional assent clause in an otherwise definite
and seasonable expression of acceptance.
By expressly conditioning its acceptance, the offeree can effec-
tively preclude the formation of a contract based on certain terms
on the offeror's form. If the goods are then shipped and accepted,
however, the terms on the offeree's form do not govern the transac-
tion.148 Rather, subsection (3) appropriately determines the sub-
stantive terms of the contract.
The essence of this approach is to distinguish counteroffers
that can be accepted by the offeror's acceptance of the goods from
146. See supra text accompanying note 45.
147. This is merely a rule of thumb because, as Murray and others note, long term
business relationships and word processing make it difficult to distinguish a form from a
nonform. See Baird & Weisberg, supra note 2, at 1225-26 n.17; Incipient Unconscionabil-
ity, supra note 2, at 639.
148. This does not suggest, however, that shipment and acceptance of the goods is the
only way that the parties can recognize the existence of a contract by conduct. Shipment
and acceptance of the goods, however, is the manner suggested in the comments to § 2-207.
U.C.C. § 2-207 comment 7. While 2-207(3) requires conduct by both parties recognizing
the existence of a contract, communication between the parties prior to shipment or accept-
ance often evidences recognition by both parties that a contract exists. For example, this
could occur when the contract requires the seller to provide goods manufactured to the
buyer's specifications. The courts' recognition of this should minimize the situations in
which a party can renege on the grounds that the writings do not establish a contract, and
thereby cause substantial injury to the other party. Normally, cases in which a party re-
neges before the conduct of both parties recognizes the existence of a contract occur in
routine transactions in which the buyer can purchase elsewhere or the seller can resell the
goods to avoid injury. In addition, this situation most often occurs early in the transacting
process, reducing the likelihood of substantial injury.
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those that cannot. The analysis involves two simple steps. The
first step is to determine whether the offeree's response is a definite
and seasonable expression of acceptance. Again, the interpreta-
tion of a reasonable offeror is controlling. If the response is a
clear counteroffer which indicates that acceptance of the goods by
the offeror constitutes assent to all the terms of the counteroffer,
then the latter terms govern the transaction if the goods are
shipped and accepted. If the response is a definite and seasonable
expression of acceptance, however, the second step is to determine
whether the offeree expressly conditioned acceptance on assent to
its terms. For the acceptance to be expressly conditional, it must
contain language which tracks the conditional assent language of
2-207(1) and be conspicuous by Code definition. Otherwise, it
constitutes an acceptance of the offeror's terms, with the possibil-
ity of additional nonmaterial terms becoming part of the contract
under section 2-207(2).
Requiring adherance to the statutory conditional acceptance
language will produce certainty and efficiency. The offeree can
print this language on a form just as easily and economically as
other conditional language. Also, employing the statutory lan-
guage will ensure that the exchange of forms does not create a
contract. The offeror can easily train low-level personnel to locate
the statutory language and establish routine procedures to handle
forms that arrive containing this language. The offeror's person-
nel need not concern themselves with reading and understanding
all the fine print on every offeree's form, unless such conditional
assent language exists. Even then, such language can be safely
ignored unless the offeror can be assured that material additions
or changes to its offer proposed by the offeree's form will not be-
come part of a contract later formed by the parties' performance.
An operative conditional assent clause must also be conspicu-
ous by Code definition. Again, this will provide certainty without
increasing the offeree's costs. Although some commentators sug-
gest that an offeror might not notice a conditional assent clause
even if it is conspicuous by Code definition, 149 conspicuousness at
least enhances the offeror's ability to spot the term and train low-
level personnel to respond to it.
B. The Merits of Formalism
It is true that the proposed approach is quite formalistic. In
149. See Barron & Dunfee, supra note 2, at 184; Taylor, supra note 2, at 440.
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fact, reliance upon form is one of Dean Murray's primary objec-
tions to the decided cases.150 This concern is particularly serious
because of the Code's bias against formalism and its emphasis on
commercial reality. '51 Why should courts interpret and apply sec-
tion 2-207 in a manner contrary to the general thrust of the Code?
The reliance on form is justified only when its advantages are un-
usually great or its dangers unusually small in a particular con-
text. The battle of the forms presents such a context.
Generally, formalism enhances the predictability of the law.
Predictability may be more important in commercial law than in
other contexts.' 52 Predictability of legal results allows business
people to plan more efficiently their affairs and reduces litigation
costs to society. Nonetheless, a salient problem is that formal
rules 53 often achieve greater predictability at the expense of jus-
tice in the resolution of individual cases. 154 For example, if an
offeree satisfies the formal requirement of a conspicuous condi-
tional assent clause, the exchange of forms does not form a con-
tract, despite the fact that the offeror, unaware of the existence or
the legal effect of the clause, assumed that a contract existed.
Also, one might consider it unfair to allow the offeree to renege
later simply because it complied with the formality of the condi-
tional assent clause.
The fairness problem, however, is arguably insignificant in the
context of section 2-207. Formalism does not necessarily lead to
unfair results even if strictly applied. This is most often true when
people can easily understand and follow the formal requirements
and readily and economically attain awareness of them. When all
or most of these criteria are present, the failure to follow the for-
mality does not engender much sympathy. Indeed, the failure to
consider the formality when planning one's affairs, or the failure
to learn about the formality, may approximate negligence and jus-
tify the harsh consequences. The nature and effect of a conditional
assent clause is easy to understand, as it operates with certainty
150. Incipient Unconscionability, supra note 2, at 637-38.
151. See Baird & Weisberg, supra note 2, at 1221-22; Danzig, supra note 122, at 621,
626-27.
152. See supra text accompanying and following note 124.
153. For an excellent discussion of the nature of formal rules and discretionary stan-
dards in the context of § 2-207, see Baird & Weisberg, supra note 2, at 1227-31.
154. See, e.g., Davis v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 483 F.2d 1014 (4th Cir. 1973)
(party to oral contract escaped liability for repudiation despite clear evidence of contract's
existence); cf. In re Will of Poppe, 60 Misc. 2d 418, 302 N.Y.S.2d 708 (Sur. Ct. 1969)
(nonholograhpic will denied enforcement for lack of a witness and an attestation clause).
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and simplicity. It is easy to explain to a businessman that a condi-
tional assent clause precludes contract formation and that the of-
feree can await the assent of the offeror or perform and have the
gaps in the forms filled by the Code. Meeting the formal require-
ments is not expensive-the cost of printing a conditional assent
clause on a form is hardly a significant expense. Finally, most
business people appear to have the economic means to become
informed about the required formalities and their effect, and com-
ply with them.
In addition, the approach suggested in this Article places only
limited reliance on formality. The essential issue of whether an
offeree definitely and seasonably accepted an offer remains gov-
erned by a standard rather than a formal rule. This Article only
suggests a formal rule to permit an offeree efficienty to preclude
harsh terms on the offeror's form from becoming part of a result-
ing contract, while permitting the offeror efficiently to recognize
the offeree's conditional assent.
The proposed formality poses far less potential for harsh re-
sults than the old mirror image rule. Unlike the latter rule, the
suggested approach will never result in the offeree's imposing all
of its terms, unless the offeror expressly assents to those terms or
accepts the goods under circumstances which clearly imply that
assent. In addition, the decided cases already suggest much of the
formality inherent in this interpretaion of section 2-207. For ex-
ample, the Dorton case and others strongly suggest that language
of conditional assent should closely track the language of section
2-207(1)."' Further, the cases almost uniformly treat the formal
language of conditional assent in a manner similar to the one sug-
gested here. 156
One should not uncritically assume that the Code drafters' jus-
tifiable reluctance to adopt formal rules is appropriate in the con-
text of section 2-207. The drafters sometimes explicitly adopted a
formal rule-witness section 2-316(2). It is very important to rec-
ognize that a formal interpretation of section 2-207 enables a court
to insert reasonable terms when the parties do not express a mu-
tual intent. In this respect, section 2-207 differs from other Code
sections where the drafters avoided formal rules to accomplish the
155. See Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1166 (6th Cir. 1972); In re
Chemtoy Corp., 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1635, 1639-40 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1982).
156. See supra notes 97-113 and accompanying text.
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same result.1 57 Thus, this author's interpretation of section 2-
207(3) does not ignore the Code drafters' generally felicitous de-
sire to adopt a flexible approach oriented to business reality.
C. Support in the Code's Language and the
History of Section 2-207
The suggested approach establishes, in essence, two kinds of
counteroffers-one that can be accepted by acceptance of the
goods and another that cannot. While this is a somewhat novel
approach to section 2-207,158 the results of the decided cases
clearly support it. The cases only lack the analytical foundation
and justifications this Article seeks to provide. Furthermore, the
Code's language and the history of section 2-207 support the pro-
posed interpretation.
Section 2-206 provides that an offer to make a contract is to be
construed as inviting acceptance in any manner and by any me-
dium reasonable under the circumstances. While the section
speaks in terms of offers, it seems equally applicable to counterof-
fers. Through negative implication and common sense, means
which do not reasonably communicate acceptance under the cir-
cumstances do not operate as acceptances.
Section 2-206 permits the distinction between the two types of
counteroffers suggested in this Article. If the counteroffer is not a
definite and seasonable expression of acceptance, acceptance of
the goods by the original offeror seals the contract on the offeree's
terms. Acceptance of the goods is clearly a reasonable mode of
acceptance under these circumstances. If the offeree's response is
157. See U.C.C. §§ 1-203 (obligation of good faith); 2-302 (unconscionable contract);
2-305 (open price term); 2-609 (adequate assurance of performance).
158. Commentators suggest that a response which is not a definite and seasonable ex-
pression of acceptance may merit different treatment than an acceptance which the offeror
makes conditional on the offeree's assent to the additional terms. They have, however,
either concluded that such a distinction is meritless or failed to develop the idea signifi-
cantly. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, at 165; Barron & Dunfee, supra note 2, at
194-97. Professor Farnsworth comments:
The offeree who wishes a contract on his own terms might flatly reject the offer
and make a counteroffer of his own. By not making any "expression of accept-
ance" under subsection (1), he has arguably avoided UCC 2-207 altogether and so
is not bound by subsection (3). Subsequent performance by the original offeror
ought in that case to be taken as an acceptance of all the terms of the offeree's
counteroffer.
E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, at 165. Professor Farnsworth concludes that subsection (3)
governs when the offeree responds with an acceptance expressly conditional on assent to
the additional or different terms. Id. at 163-65. Without further discussion, he suggests a
similar analysis to the one suggested by this author.
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not clearly a counteroffer, but contains a conspicuous conditional
assent clause, acceptance of the goods establishes a contract, al-
though not on the offeree's terms. In this case, accepting the
goods is not a reasonable mode of acceptance of the counterof-
fer.' 59 Rather, a contract results because the conduct of the par-
ties recognizes the existence of a contract. Under subsection (3),
the terms of the contract are those on which the writings agree,
plus supplementary terms provided by the Code.
This analysis has a foundation in the history of the Code, al-
though it may not reflect the drafters' intended interpretation.
The history of section 2-207 often indicates that the drafters in-
tended it to deal primarily with transactions based on an exchange
offorms, rather than transactions which take place outside a form
context. For instance, when section 2-207 underwent substantial
modification in 1954, the drafters gave the following reason for
the modification:
In order to make the battle of the forms rule work in a business
sense, there first has to be a distinction drawn between offers
which contain form clauses and those which do not, and, sec-
ondly, the conflict offorms must be arranged in a business-like
way when the parties are clearly engaged in a deal even though
the form situation has not yet been clearly ironed out. 6 '
In addition, the transcripts of the New York Law Revision Com-
mission's hearings on the U.C.C. contain continual discussion of
the operation of section 2-207 in the context of an exchange of
printed forms, as contrasted with the type of example posited by
Dean Murray.161 These comments provide a substantial historical
basis for believing that the drafters designed section 2-207 with
form transactions in mind. Thus, a reasonable basis exists for a
general requirement which both the commentators and the pres-
ent analysis suggest as a rule of thumb:162 an offeree must make a
159. This situation is somewhat analogous to the rule that an offeree generally cannot
accept an offer by silence, even if it states that silence constitutes acceptance. Silence of the
offeree is not a reasonable mode of acceptance since the offeror should recognize that si-
lence may indicate something other than acceptance of the offered terms. See I A. CORBIN,
supra note 35, at 306, 310. Similarly, the acceptance of goods may not reasonably indicate
to a counterofferor that the original offeror accepted all of the terms of its response form
when that response form is only a counteroffer, rather than an acceptance, because of the
presence of a conditional assent clause. That is, the counterofferor should be reasonably
aware that the original offeror probably has not read every fine print term on the response,
and therefore should not be able to infer assent to the terms from acceptance of the goods.
160. SUPPLEMENT No. 1, supra note 31, § 2-207, at 7 (reason for change) (emphasis
added).
161. 2 1954 LAw REVISION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 39, at 1234-35, 1260.
162. It is suggested as a rule of thumb rather than a strict rule since an offeree may
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [
counteroffer in a mode other than by return of a printed form for
it to be subject to acceptance by an offeror's acceptance of the
goods.
The 1954 supplement to the Code contains provisions which
illuminate and support the suggested analysis. 163 Section 2-207 of
the 1954 supplement provides:
(4) When a written offer is accompanied by form clauses pre-
pared by the offeror, a definite and seasonable expression of
acceptance operates as an acceptance even though it con-
tains form clauses additional to or at variance with those of
the offer, unless either
(a) the offer conspicuously makes its acceptance conditonal
on the offeree's agreement to any specified one of its
form clauses or to all of them; or
(b) the expression of acceptance conspicuously makes its
own operation conditional on the offeror's agreement to
any specified one of its form clauses or to all of them.
(5) Even though by reason of such conspicuous conditions as are
described in subsection (4) a contract fails by reason of such
exchange of writings, yet conduct by both parties which rec-
ognizes the existence of an agreement about the subject-mat-
ter is sufficient to establish the fact of agreement. In such
case the terms of the particular agreement consist of those
terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together
with any supplementary terms incorporated under either
the next subsection or any other provisions of this Act.164
The conditional nature of a conditional acceptance must be
conspicuous to be given effect under this version, otherwise it sim-
ply operates as an acceptance. Unless the requirement of conspic-
uousness was intentionally deleted to make nonconspicuous
acceptances effective, the Code history supports such a require-
ment. Further, it seems unlikely that current section 2-207's lack
of an explicit requirement of conspicuousness indicates an inten-
tion that such a requirement not exist. More importantly, the
1954 supplement's counterpart to current subsection (3) applies
only to contracts that fail because of the presence of a conspicuous
conditional clause, and does not apply to all cases where an ex-
change of writings fails to establish a contract.'65 This indicates
make a counteroffer on a printed form which may be accepted by acceptance of the goods,
provided that the offeree would clearly recognize it as an acceptance. Cf. supra note 147.
163. Professor Taylor relied upon this prior draft of§ 2-207 to support an even broader
reading of subsection (3) than this Article suggests. See Taylor, supra note 2, at 444.
164. SUPPLEMENT No. 1, supra note 31, § 2-207(4)-(5), at 6 (emphasis added).
165. Eg., when a response is a clear counteroffer for which acceptance of the goods
constitutes a reasonable mode of acceptance.
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that the drafters intended subsection (5) of the supplement to ap-
ply to a response that otherwise looks like an acceptance rather
than a counteroffer, but contains conspicuous language of condi-
tional assent. The present 2-207(3) should be given this
interpretation.
The present version of section 2-207 differs substantially from
the 1954 supplement draft. Therefore, it is possible that the lan-
guage and operation of the supplement is of little relevance to an
interpretation of section 2-207 today. One should not interpret the
changes in this manner for the following reasons. First, when the
drafters revised the text of section 2-207 to substantially its present
form in 1956, the reason for the revision was "to express more
clearly what was intended."' 66 Professor Taylor probably cor-
rectly states that it is at least a fair conclusion that the intended
meaning of the 1954 version carries over into the current ver-
sion.'6 7 Second, Professor Pasley's analysis for the New York
Law Revision Commission indicates that "[s]ubsection (3) of the
[present version] reintroduces subsection (5) of the Supplement
No. 1 version of Section 2-207, with the omission of the introduc-
tory language."' 16 8 While Professor Pasley's analysis is not defini-
tive, it was advanced at approximately the time of the revision and
gives no indication that the revision intended to change the pur-
pose and operation of the section. Third, the syntax of the earlier
version and the present version of section 2-207 indicates that
nonacceptances and conditional acceptances are two different
things. Section 2-207(1) indicates that a definite and seasonable
expression of acceptance operates as an acceptance unless the of-
feree makes acceptance expressly conditional on assent to the ad-
ditional or different terms present in its form. Thus, the
phraseology of section 2-207 indicates that a response can be a
definite and seasonable expression of acceptance, and simultane-
ously be expressly conditional.
Dean Murray calls the term "acceptance" in the subsection (1)
proviso "misused" and "unfortunate" since it intends to describe a
counteroffer. 169 Dean Murray overstates the case. Based upon the
section's historical development, the use of the term "acceptance"
166. ALI, 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-207, at 28 (1957).
167. Taylor, supra note 2, at 444-45.
168. STATE OF NEW YORK, I REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR
1955-STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 726.
169. Incipient Unconscionability, supra note 2, at 610. See supra note 61.
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at least makes some sense, even if it does not provide great clarity
or accord with traditional contract doctrine. Contrary to Dean
Murray's analysis, a conditional acceptance does not describe any
counteroffer. It describes a particular kind of counteroffer-a re-
sponse that otherwise looks like an acceptance, but contains the
conditional language suggested by the Code. Indeed, the present
section 2-207 suggests that it contemplates two different kinds of
counteroffers, and the history of the Code indicates that its draft-
ers meant subsection (3) to apply only to the kind containing the
language of conditional assent.
This history does not provide conclusive support for this Arti-
cle's approach. It does, however, provide some support and a re-
sponse to those who might suggest that this analysis essentially
creates a new 2-207 which has little to do with the present text. It
is noteworthy that other commentators17 0 and some cases' 17 sug-
gest that 2-207 contemplates two separate categories of response.
It must be conceded, however, that the language and history of
section 2-207 reasonably admit of interpretations which differ
from the one suggested herein. Therefore, the ultimate justifica-
tion for the approach must be functional.
D. Accommodating Fairness, Predictability, and Efficiency
This Article's approach is one that substantially accommo-
dates the principles of fairness, predictability, and efficiency. The
approach promotes efficiency by permitting continuation of the ef-
ficient form mode of operation without creating potentially harsh
and unexpected consequences for either party. It permits an of-
feree to prevent efficiently any terms appearing on the offeror's
form from operating in a harsh, oppressive, or unexpected man-
ner. 172 To do so, the offeree must sacrifice the additional or differ-
ent terms on its form that may be oppressive to or not expected by
the offeror, unless the latter expressly assents to those terms. The
offeree can, of course, demand such assent before performing. In
certain instances, it can simply choose not to contract by the use of
170. See, e.g., Barron & Dunfee, supra note 2, at 177-78.
171. See, e.g., Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1166 (6th Cir. 1972);
In re Chemtoy Corp., 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1635, 1638 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1982);
Album Graphics v. Beatrice Foods Co., 87 I1l. App. 3d 338, 347, 408 N.E.2d 1041, 1048
(1980); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Chambers Gasket & Mfg., 177 Ind. App. 508, 516-18, 380 N.E.2d
571, 577-78 (1978).
172. The offeree probably will not be subjected to any unexpected or oppressive terms
because subsection (3) provides that the Code supply terms when the parties' forms do not
agree; it is unlikely that such terms will be unexpected or oppressive.
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printed forms. The offeree will then not be bound by terms to
which it has not agreed. Alternatively, the offeree may choose to
make all or a portion of its sales in the form mode, but with a
conspicuous conditional assent clause. It can thus ensure that op-
pressive or unexpected terms in the offeror's form will not become
part of the contract. In addition, the offeree will know that the
substantive terms of any contract resulting from the parties' per-
formance will be those upon which the parties agreed and those
supplied by the Code (presumably fair to both offeror and of-
feree). The offeree will also have the efficiency advantages of op-
erating in a form mode, but not the advantage of any terms in its
form neither contained in the offeror's form nor supplied by the
Code. It will risk, however, that the offeror will reject the goods,
which leaves the offeree with no contractual basis for recovery. In
short, the offeree can make an informed choice of a method of
doing business, knowing that regardless of the method chosen it
will operate in a reasonably certain world.
Conversely, this approach protects the original offeror, who
does not read in its entirety every form that appears to be a defi-
nite and seasonable expression of acceptance, from the potentially
unfair and surprising results of the last shot doctrine. The offeror
may continue to operate in the form mode without fear of a hind-
sight determination that it failed to recognize reasonably the
counteroffer nature of a conditional acceptance and thus accepted
a counteroffer by performance. In addition, the certainty and sim-
plicity of the suggested approach facilitates an offeror's ability to
employ low-level personnel to survey forms received from offerees
and extract conditional acceptances for special treatment. If the
offeror truly wishes to obtain those terms on its form which are
neither contained in the offeree's form nor supplied by the Code,
it must actively negotiate them.
Requiring the offerees of the world to use the magic words of
section 2-207(1) is not unfair, as other sections of the Code require
magic words in other circumstances. 173 Section 2-316(2) contains
a similar formal requirement which mandates that a seller men-
tion the word "merchantability" to disclaim the implied warranty
of merchantability. 74 One must remember that the battle of the
forms often occurs in a relatively sophisticated business environ-
173. See C. Itoh & Co. (America) v. Jordan Int'l Co., 552 F.2d 1228, 1235 (7th Cir.
1977).
174. U.C.C. § 2-316(2). The Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act also establishes very specific requirements that must appear on most
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ment among actors with the means to consult counsel. Indeed, the
advice of counsel probably contributed greatly to the existence
and complexity of the battle of the forms. Therefore, it is unlikely
that many offerees transacting in a form mode will be unaware of
the magic words which are essential to create an expressly condi-
tional acceptance invoking subsection (3).
Similarly, the stringent requirements for creating true counter-
offers, where acceptance of the goods operates as an acceptance of
the counteroffer, result in no unfairness to offerees. The offeree
totally controls its response to an offer. If it has a sincere interest
in obtaining terms so unusual or one-sided that neither the of-
feror's form nor the Code would supply them, the terms should
become the subject of active negotiation between responsible of-
ficers of the parties. They should not become part of the contract
because a judge or jury, in hindsight, found that a reasonable of-
feror should have understood the response to be a counteroffer
which it accepted by acceptance of the goods. The ease and speed
of modern communication renders it unlikely that a departure
from the form mode will interfere with timely delivery of the
goods. Therefore, the offeree rarely will have to ship the goods
before it can negotiate a desired term.
The approach is also fair to offerors. The test for a counteroffer
acceptable by performance is sufficiently stringent that an offeror
will rarely find that it unknowingly accepted terms appearing on
an offeree's response merely by accepting the goods. The offeror
will also not encounter substantial disadvantage if it continues to
deal routinely with apparently routine responses from offerees.
The presence in a response of magic words necessary to avoid a
contract on the basis of an exchange of writings invokes subsec-
tion (3). The offeror then receives the substantial protection of all
the Code rights and remedies normally expected. Finally, under
section 2-207(3), the contract contains those terms expected by the
parties because of usage of trade, course of dealing, or course of
performance. 17 5
written warranties for consumer products. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2302, 2303 (1976) and accom-
panying regulations.
175. The commentators are uniform in suggesting that usage of trade, course of deal-
ing, and course of performance can supply contractual terms under § 2-207(3). See, e.g., I
W. HAWKLAND, supra note 69, at 108-10; Barron & Dunfee, supra note 2, at 198; Incipient
Unconscionabilify, supra note 2, at 623.
The terms of a contract under § 2-207 are "those terms on which the writings of the
parties agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provi-
sions of this Act." U.C.C. § 2-207(3). Two relevant provisions of the Code are §§ 1-201(3)
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IV. THE FORMAL APPROACH OF BAIRD AND WEISBERG
A recent article by Professors Baird and Weisberg advocates a
return to the mirror image rule in the context of the battle of the
forms.'7 6 Like this Article, it concludes that the resolution of the
battle of the forms is peculiarly amenable to a more formal ap-
proach than the one presently accepted. This author believes that
Professors Baird and Weisberg, in supporting a return to the mir-
ror image rule, place too much reliance upon unwarranted and
largely unsupported hypotheses which are contrary to the entire
set of factual assumptions underlying section 2-207. Furthermore,
acceptance of this Article's approach renders a return to the mir-
ror image rule entirely unnecessary to resolve the problems which
Baird and Weisberg attempt to cure.
Baird and Weisberg advocate a return to the mirror image rule
primarily because the "off the rack" Code terms supplied under
section 2-207(3) are not suitable for some transactions; i.e., they
are not the most efficient terms for particular transactions. 177
They argue that a return to the mirror image rule will accomplish
this result at a cost which does not outweigh the increased effi-
ciency of the terms.' 78 Simplified, their argument maintains that
the mirror image rule will cause offerors to read the fine print on
and 1-201(11), which define "agreement" and "contract," respectively. Section 1-201(3) de-
fines agreement as including terms implied from usage of trade, course of dealing, and
course of performance. The definition of contract in § 1-201(11) includes the parties' agree-
ment. Thus, since § 2-207(3) recognizes a contract formed by the parties' conduct, usage of
trade, course of dealing, and course of performance would necessarily be a part of it. See
Taylor, supra note 2, at 432.
A recent case suggests that course of dealing, usage of trade, and course of performance
cannot become part of the contract under § 2-207(3), but that only the "gap-filler" provi-
sions of Article Two (primarily found in Part 3) can provide supplementary terms. C. Itoh
& Co. (America) v. Jordan Int'l Co., 552 F.2d 1228, 1237 (7th Cir. 1977). This suggestion
seems blatantly incorrect. Assuming neither form mentions the subject matter of usage of
trade or course of dealing, it seems absurd to suggest that such matters cannot be integrated
into the contract. The question whether course of dealing or trade usage should fill con-
tractual gaps is not predicated upon the manner in which the contract is formed when the
parties express no intention regarding a particular subject. If one party's form contains a
term which is contrary to course of dealing or usage of trade, it should not preclude reli-
ance upon usage of trade or course of dealing to control the relevant subject matter. A
party should not be able to frustrate the other party's expectations by a fine print term on a
form. For cases suggesting that course of dealing, usage of trade, and course of perform-
ance may be relevant under § 2-207(3), see Scott Brass, Inc. v. C & C Metal Prods. Corp.,
473 F. Supp. 1124, 1130 (D.R.I. 1979); In re Barney Schogel, Inc., 12 Bankr. 697, 703
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981).
176. Baird & Weisberg, supra note 2.
177. Id. at 1223, 1249-51.
178. Id. at 1251-61.
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responses received from offerees, since they are aware that these
terms might become part of the contract if ignored. Knowing that
offerors will read the fine print on their forms, offerees will not
include one-sided terms for fear of losing the offeror's business.
As a result, the terms actually included on the offerees' forms will
generally be fair and acceptable to offerors. Suitable terms will
become part of the contract without a significant increase in nego-
tiation costs.
The assumptions underlying this creative and plausible argu-
ment present a number of problems. Baird and Weisberg argue
that modem buyers (usually the offerors in the battle of the forms)
are typically aware of the most important fine print terms on sell-
ers' forms. 179 Consequently, the fear that a return to the last shot
approach will result in the offeror's being bound to terms of which
it was unaware is probably exaggerated. If it is true that buyers
generally are aware of sellers' fine print, however, a return to the
mirror image rule appears to be unnecessary. As Baird and Weis-
berg acknowledge, all buyers need not read sellers' forms to
prompt sellers to avoid one-sided terms, but only a sufficient
number of those that are aware of the seller's fine print. 8 ° If a
significant number of these buyers already exist, sellers' forms
may be as mutually advantageous as they are likely to become, if
one accepts Baird and Weisberg's assumption that sellers are
afraid of losing buyers' business because of one-sided fine print on
their forms. Adopting a rule that encourages more buyers to read
sellers' forms will only increase costs without any concurrent ben-
efit because these mutually advantageous terms already exist on
sellers' forms.
It is possible that while modern buyers are generally aware of
the terms on sellers' forms, this does not provide an incentive to
sellers to avoid one-sided fine print terms. The argument is that
although buyers are aware of sellers' fine print, they also know
that under present case law this fine print usually does not become
part of a resulting contract.' 8' Consequently, they are not
prompted to take their business elsewhere. Further, sellers are
usually aware of the buyers' reasoning, and thus have no incentive
to avoid one-sided terms for fear of losing business. The problem
with this line of reasoning is that if sellers are aware that their
179. Id. at 1253-54.
180. Id. at 1254, 1257.
181. Baird and Weisberg accept this conclusion regarding the present state of the law.
See id. at 1245-48. This author concurs and supports this conclusion.
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one-sided fine print cannot become part of the contract, they have
no incentive to include the terms. Printing one-sided terms is sim-
ply a fruitless exercise which only produces unjustified costs and
the possible alienation of some buyers. If Baird and Weisberg's
belief that buyers are typically aware of one-sided terms on sell-
ers' forms is correct, then sellers already have the incentive not to
include such terms.
It may be that encouraging even more buyers to read forms by
returning to the mirror image rule will result in fewer sellers using
one-sided terms, or less one-sided terms. Whether the efficiency
savings of this marginal increase would be sufficient to overcome
the additional costs is certainly problematic. Baird and Weisberg
do not address this issue.
Baird and Weisberg may also be incorrect in believing that
buyers today are typically aware of the fine print terms on sellers'
forms. First, the empirical evidence presented in support of the
assertion is very sketchy and inconclusive.'82 Baird and Weisberg
recognize that their supporting authority, the Beale and Dugdale
article, used a very limited sample and dealt with British, rather
than American, business practices. 83 In addition, the applicable
law in England at the time of the study was the mirror image rule
rather than a rule like section 2-207. Consequently, the Beale and
Dugdale article has extremely limited value for assessing the ac-
tual practices of American businessmen.
Second, the entire factual basis of section 2-207 was that busi-
nessmen do not read the fine print on other parties' forms. The
legislative history of and the comments to section 2-207 reflect this
assumption, 84 first made when the mirror image rule was still the-
oretically viable. It is unlikely that the assumption would remain
unchallenged if it were not substantially true. 85 Therefore, it ap-
pears unlikely that modem buyers are typically aware of fine print
182. The actual practices, knowledge, and beliefs of businessmen in the context of the
battle of forms are an exceptionally fertile ground for research. A few preliminary articles
tend to support very different conclusions. Compare Beale & Dugdale, Contracts Between
Businessmen: Planning and the Use of Contractual Remedies, 2 BIrT. J. OF L. & Soc'Y 45,
50 (1975) (businessmen are often aware of fine print terms in the forms of those with whom
they deal), with Non-Contractual Relations, supra note 11, at 60 (businessmen often transact
without knowledge of fine print terms).
183. Baird & Weisberg, supra note 2, at 1254 n.87.
184. See, e.g., 2 1954 LAW REvisION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 39, at 1234-36,
1260-62; U.C.C. § 2-207 comment 1.
185. Most scholars in the area seem to accept this assumption: See, e.g., E. FARNS-
WORTH, supra note 11, at 158-59; R. NORDSTROM, supra note 69, at 92-93; J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, supra note 32, at 24; Incipient Unconscionability, supra note 2, at 605-06.
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on sellers' forms. It is also at least questionable whether a return
to the mirror image rule will cause businessmen to read the fine
print on the other party's form since the assumption underlying 2-
207 and the timing of its adoption seem to indicate that they ne-
glected to do so when the rule was previously in force. 186
Baird and Weisberg also suggest that strict enforcement of the
mirror image rule will provide the incentive lacking under the ear-
lier flexible enforcement. 87 Regardless of the way courts actually
applied the mirror image rule prior to the adoption of the Code,
substantial evidence exists that many people, including commer-
cial experts of the time, thought that the courts strictly applied the
rule. 88 In fact, Baird and Weisberg are unique in their belief that
the courts did not apply the rule in a draconian fashion. Thus, this
argument is also dubious.
Even assuming that a return to the mirror image rule will
cause buyers to examine the fine print on sellers' forms more
closely, it is doubtful that this will cause sellers to make the terms
of their forms more mutually advantageous. The purchase order
and acknowledgment forms collected at random by this author
contain numerous self-interested provisions. For example, the
warranty provisions in the purchase order forms are at least as
expansive as the warranty and remedy provisions supplied by the
Code. Conversely, the warranty and remedy provisions in the
sellers' forms uniformly provide more limited coverage than the
Code. This sample does not conclusively predict the content of
forms upon a return to the mirror image rule. It does indicate,
however, that if Baird and Weisberg correctly state that buyers
presently read sellers' forms, a return to the mirror image rule
may not cause sellers to alter their forms drastically. The latter
statement would be false only if businessmen are generally aware
of current court decisions which largely abrogate the mirror image
rule and apply section 2-207(3). As stated previously, if business-
186. See Baird & Weisberg, supra note 2, at 1258-59. Baird and Weisberg question the
courts' willingness to apply the mirror image rule strictly and advocate a statutory substi-
tute for § 2-207. Id. at 1259-61. The substitute is a legend designed to make it obvious
that the response was a counteroffer and the buyer's acceptance of the goods is an accept-
ance of the counteroffer. Id. at 1260-61. The interpretation of § 2-207 advocated here
renders a substitute statute unnecessary. If the legend was such that it "attracted the atten-
tion of all who gave the form even a cursory glance," id. at 1260, it would not be a definite
and seasonable expression of acceptance, and the mirror image rule would apply.
187. Baird & Weisberg, supra note 2, at 1231-35, 1258-61.
188. See, e.g., 1 A. CORBIN, supra note 35, at § 86; 1 S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON
CONTRACTS § 77 (3d ed. 1957). This notion persists today. See, e.g., J. WHITE & R. SUM-
MERS, supra note 32, at 25; Incipient Unconscionability, supra note 2, at 608-09.
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men do have this awareness, sellers already have no incentive to
put self-interested provisions (different from Code "off the rack"
terms) in their forms as they should recognize that the terms will
not become part of the contract.
This last point strikes at the heart of Baird and Weisberg's
analysis. If businessmen (especially sellers) are presently aware of
courts' liberal utilization of section 2-207(3), little incentive exists
to use heavily self-interested forms. A return to the mirror image
rule actually would seem to provide increased incentive for sellers
to make their forms more self-interested, as a seller might hope to
sneak a self-interested provision past an unwary buyer who ne-
glects to read the seller's form in detail. Baird and Weisberg ad-
vance the counterargument that sellers' fear of losing buyers'
business would prevent this practice under the mirror image rule.
This position seems unrealistic and the empirical evidence clearly
does not support it. It seems intuitively more correct to think that
this risk is slight. Breaking off negotiations with one seller and
finding another is itself costly, and a buyer considering such a
move must consider the likely possibility that the second seller
will have the same objectionable term in its form. Even assuming
the buyer reads the seller's form and incurs that cost, it is unlikely
to be willing to incur the. additional cost and risk of taking its
business elsewhere. Rather, it is more likely either to accept the
seller's terms or actively negotiate an objectionable term.
If businessmen are not generally aware of courts' liberal appli-
cation of 2-207(3), sellers probably include self-interested terms
because they (or their lawyers) think that the terms might become
part of the contract. This would be the result under the mirror
image rule. This author believes that simply informing buyers
and sellers of the courts' intention to provide "off the rack" Code
terms when the parties provide conflicting self-interested terms is
a much better way to create the incentive for removing the terms
than a return to the mirror image rule.
Finally, the primary purpose of Baird and Weisberg's thesis is
to increase the efficiency of the terms in a contract resulting from a
battle of the forms. They offer no evidence, apart from some spec-
ulation and a hypothetical,18 9 that Code "off the rack" terms are
not generally efficient. At least they are less costly than scrutiniz-
ing the forms and negotiating those terms which might result from
an application of the mirror image rule.
189. Baird & Weisberg, supra note 2, at 1249-51.
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The approach advocated by Baird and Weisberg is both specu-
lative and unnecessary and it is built on a series of counterintui-
tive and largely unsupported assumptions. It questions, without
substantiation, the very factual foundation accepted by the draft-
ers of the Code and section 2-207. In the final analysis, it advo-
cates an approach that would, at best, do no more than simply
inform today's businessmen of the present state of the law.
V. CONCLUSION
The approach suggested by this Article largely fulfills the goals
of efficiency, predictability, and fairness. It is as consistent with
the ephemeral intent of the drafters as any other suggested ap-
proach. The cases decided to date are generally not inconsistent
with it, and when viewed in their entirety, solidly support it.
This Article's approach makes certain intuitively plausible as-
sumptions. It assumes that businessmen will continue to transact
in a form mode, even when it involves substantial risks. Recent
history certainly supports this assumption, otherwise the drafters
would not have included section 2-207 in the Code. The analysis
is premised on the importance to business professionals of a high
degree of predictability in the law. Unlike Dean Murray, this au-
thor does not believe that achieving a high degree of predictability
in this context requires a significant sacrifice of other values. The
parties to transactions involving the battle of the forms are not
unsophisticated consumers who are unlikely to understand a
crafty lawyer's use of legalese to accomplish a result that is neither
fair nor expected. Both sides of the transaction normally involve
people or firms that can and do obtain legal counsel. In the ab-
sence of this sophistication, courts can invoke other provisions of
the Code to supersede the operation of 2-207 and reach a fair
result. 190
The advocated approach is consistent with one of the primary
purposes of the U.C.C.: to encompass and sanction the actual rea-
sonable practices of business professionals in the marketplace.' 9'
To a degree, it permits and encourages the continued utilization of
efficient form transactions, while decreasing the potential for un-
fairness and surprise. It grants neither party an unfair advantage
and retains the essentially felicitous rule that an offeror or offeree
that clearly expresses itself remains in control of the legal effect.
190. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-203, 2-302, 2-719(3).
191. See U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b); Danzig, supra note 122, at 626.
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The analysis is not without problems, as it inevitably must fail to
resolve equitably some marginal cases. Perhaps this is unavoida-
ble, especially when it addresses a provision which Professor Gil-
more called "a miserable, bungled, patched-up job." 192
Nonetheless, the author believes that the Code can function fairly
and efficiently in the large majority of cases.
192. Gilmore Letter, supra note 144.
